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Digital Patent Infringement in an Era
of 3D Printing
Timothy R. Holbrook†* & Lucas S. Osborn**
The digital revolution has now moved beyond music and video files. A
person can now translate three-dimensional objects into digital files and,
at the press of a button, recreate those items via a 3D printer or similar
device. Just as digitization placed pressure on the copyright system, so will
these digital computer-aided design (“CAD”) files stress the patent system.
Patents directed to physical objects can now have their value appropriated
not only by the transfer of physical embodiments but also by the
transferring of CAD files designed to print the invention. We term this
phenomenon digital patent infringement.
In this Article, we explore the ways the patent system can respond to
protect patent owners against the appropriation of their inventions via
these digital files. First, we explore whether indirect infringement
doctrines sufficiently protect patent holders against these CAD files. Given
the nature of likely accused indirect infringers, we conclude, contrary to
earlier literature, that these doctrines likely are not up to the task.
Second, we offer novel theories of direct “digital” patent infringement
based on the CAD files alone. We consider whether offers to sell and sales
of these files should constitute direct patent infringement. Because such
commercial activity is an appropriation of the economic value of the
patented invention, we believe the law should recognize such an
infringement theory. Next, rejecting the prior assumptions of the
literature, we explore whether the CAD files alone should be viewed as
infringement for making the patented device, given the de minimis effort
it takes to create the item via a 3D printer or related device. As a
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technological matter, the line between the digital and the tangible has
eroded to the point where the file and the item are viewed as
interchangeable. Under this view, the files alone should be infringing. As a
legal and policy matter, however, such expansion of patent infringement
liability could have significant chilling effects on other actors and
incentives, giving us pause in extending liability in this context.
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INTRODUCTION
It is hard to believe that the first iPod was released in 2001, a mere
fourteen years ago.1 We quickly moved from bulky Sony Walkmans, to
the click-wheel iPods with mini-hard drives, to now having flash
memory. CDs, the previously disruptive technology that sent vinyl
albums into the dustbin of history, were quickly displaced by digital
music files and portable music players. This transition in our culture from
a physical to a digital world has occurred at an impressive, if not dizzying,
pace. From smartphone apps to digital music streaming services, our
world has replaced the tangible and the analog with the digital.
Since the 1990s, the ability to make and share multiple copies of
two-dimensional pictures and movies with negligible cost has brought
benefits, such as increased access to information and cultural
innovation. Yet the facility with which one can make and share digital
copies has brought tremendous pressure on the copyright regime from
unauthorized digital books, movies, images, and songs. The terms
Napster, Grokster, and BitTorrent instantly call to mind the impact
digitization has had on the entertainment and music industries. But
the process is not over yet, and the digital world and the physical
world continue to intertwine and merge. The line between hardware
and software has effectively eroded.2 For example, most of our buttons
on smart phones are now “virtual” — icons on a screen — rather than
physical, mechanical objects.
New technologies now are adding a (literal) third dimension to the
commingling of the physical and digital worlds, allowing people to
create complex, tangible objects directly from digital files. For
example, three-dimensional printers, scanners, and computer-aided
design (“CAD”) programs allow people to translate physical objects
into digital files and, more ominously for patent holders, to then
translate the digital files back into physical objects.3 With these 3D
printers, we can now move, almost seamlessly, between the physical
1 Apple Press Info, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/pr/products/ipodhistory/ (last
visited Aug. 11, 2014).
2 See Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (“[P]rocess and product — software and hardware — are practically
interchangeable in the field of computer technology. On a functioning computer,
software morphs into hardware and vice versa at the touch of a button.” (citation
omitted)). See generally Mike Bacidore, Software Replaces Machine Hardware, but
Mechanical Solutions Still Have Their Places, CONTROL DESIGN (Oct. 8, 2009), http://
www.controldesign.com/articles/2009/mechanicalsolutions0910 (providing examples
of software overtaking hardware with respect to electronic device controls).
3 See discussion infra Part I.
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and the digital worlds. Additionally, advances in chemistry and
biology allow scientists to digitally design DNA and other chemicals
and to feed digital files to a machine that will directly manufacture the
molecules.4 Collectively, we term these technologies digital
manufacturing technology (“DMT”).
Like previous digitization technologies, these new technologies
bring both excitement and stress. In particular, DMT places pressure
on all aspects of the intellectual property regime.5 One respected
research firm predicts that by 2018, intellectual property theft due to
3D printing alone will create losses of $100 billion per year.6 The
focus of this Article is the impact DMT is having7 and will have on the
patent system.8
Historically, someone could only infringe a patent if there was a
physical embodiment of the invention claimed in the patent.9 To
infringe, someone had to build the “better mousetrap,” complete with
springs and levers, not simply design it on paper. Even patents on
processes or methods are typically infringed when there is a machine
or other device that performs the process.10 If we create a new method
4

See infra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
See Lucas S. Osborn, Intellectual Property’s Digital Future, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL TRANSFORMATIONS (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds.,
forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=2533673; Lucas S. Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The
Converging Worlds of Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 582-92 (2014)
[hereinafter Regulating 3D Printing].
6 Gartner Says Uses of 3D Printing Will Ignite Major Debate on Ethics and
Regulation, GARTNER (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2658315.
7 See Heesun Wee, The ‘Gold Rush’ for 3-D Printing Patents, CNBC (Aug. 15, 2013,
10:48 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100942655 (documenting fervent patent activity
related to 3D printing).
8 Intellectual property regimes in other countries also will have to wrestle with
the impact of 3D printing. See, e.g., Pedro Malaquias, The 3D Printing Revolution: An
Intellectual Property Analysis (Aug. 8, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495416 (discussing impact of 3D
printing on UK intellectual property law).
9 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent
Infringement for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale
Patentability Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 755
(2003) [hereinafter Threat of a Sale] (“Historically, for there to be infringement, the
allegedly infringing device had to be in a physically complete form.”); Katherine J.
Strandburg, What If There Were a Business Method Use Exemption to Patent
Infringement?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 245, 254-57 (discussing patent law’s adjustments
to intangible business method and software patents).
10 See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1193, 1196-97 (Ct. Cl.
1980) (explaining that a method of controlling satellites was infringed by the
particular system in question); Acme Steel Co. v. E. Venetian Blind Co., 130 F. Supp.
5
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of making aspirin, we will infringe only when a plant is built, and we
begin to use the method.
This historical anchoring to the physical, however, has its roots in
the industrial age, when most innovation actually did relate to tangible
things.11 In the digital era, it is at best unclear whether we should
retain the vestiges of an earlier era when assessing the scope of patent
infringement. While courts have confronted these issues on the front
end — assessing whether patents should cover intangible inventions
like software or methods of doing business12 — they have yet to
wrestle with these issues on the backend when assessing infringement
based on DMT technologies.
At first blush, digital patent infringement might seem preposterous.
After all, creating blueprints for a patented device does not infringe a
claim directed to the device.13 But a dismissive reaction ignores the
potential impact on the economic value of a patent. Even now, a
person who possesses a digital file of a wrench or a fuel injector is a
3D printer and one push of a button away from having the physical
item itself. As quality 3D printers make their way into the average
person’s home, the difference between having a CAD file and having
the physical object will become increasingly inconsequential.
Moreover, people can print the physical object in the privacy of their
office or home without the need to purchase the physical device from
a mass-produced source. Hence, DMT decentralizes and partially
anonymizes the manufacture of tangible objects, inviting comparisons

459, 465-68 (D. Md. 1955) (comparing the claimed method to the machine accused of
performing the method to find no infringement); cf. Richard S. Gruner, Intangible
Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355,
355-57, 360 (2002).
11 See Gruner, supra note 10, at 360.
12 See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (holding
that a method of intermediated settlement was not patent eligible even if computer
implemented); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611-12 (2010) (ruling that a method of
hedging against risk of commodity price fluctuations was ineligible for patent
protection); DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, LP, No. 2013-1505, 2014 WL
6845152, at *1, *12 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2014) (holding that “systems and methods of
generating a composite web page” were eligible for patent protection).
13 Niks v. Marinette Paper Co., 11 F.R.D. 384, 385 (N.D.N.Y. 1951) (indicating
that blueprints of a physical device alone are not sufficient to find patent
infringement); Luten v. Camp, 221 F. 424, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1915) (“The substantial issue
is whether the defendants have infringed the plaintiff’s patents. The materiality and
relevancy of the contract and blueprints is dependent upon the plaintiff establishing
(1) that they infringe, and (2) that they were produced by or under the direction of
any of the defendants leading up to the contract, or are part of a contract entered into
between any of the defendants.”).
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to file-sharing technologies that brought consternation to the media
industries.14 If we can make our own patented wrenches in the privacy
of our own homes, why bother to purchase them from the patent
owner?15
If these digital files undermine the economic value of a patented
invention, then they risk undermining the incentives that the patent
system is meant to create.16 Unless the patentee can exert a measure of
control over the CAD files that will manufacture her patented
invention, her incentive to engage in innovative activity will be
dampened.
Because the line between the tangible and intangible is increasingly
blurred, the patent system will have to react. In short, is there (and
should there be) a difference between an infringing, tangible item and
a digital file that effortlessly allows the creation of that same tangible
item?17 If so, what are the appropriate infringement scenarios that will
adequately protect patent owners without creating undue costs on
competitors and other innovators?
We confront this situation directly, offering a doctrinal and
normative assessment of such “digital” patent infringement. In so
doing, we fill a gap in the literature on what constitutes infringement
relating to digital technologies. To date, commentators have assumed
without much analysis that digital files do not infringe patent claims
directed to a physical device.18 We challenge that assumption and, for
14 See Ben Depoorter, Intellectual Property Infringements & 3D Printing:
Decentralized Piracy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1483, 1493-1502 (2014) (comparing 3D printing
and file sharing); Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the
Dilemma of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725,
726-28 (2005) (describing peer-to-peer filesharing and the recording industry’s
reaction to it).
15 Or, for that matter, to purchase parts to repair items we already own. See Kelsey
B. Wilbanks, The Challenges of 3D Printing to the Repair-Reconstruction Doctrine in
Patent Law, 20 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 1147, 1147-48 (2013).
16 See generally, e.g., William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369,
374-76 (2011) (describing the incentive theory through which inventors can recoup
research and development costs).
17 Cf. Simon Bradshaw, Adrian Bowyer & Patrick Haufe, The Intellectual Property
Implications of Low-Cost 3D Printing, 7 SCRIPTED 5, 26-27 (2010) (discussing
potential theories of infringement for files under the United Kingdom’s patent laws),
available at http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol7-1/bradshaw.asp.
18 See, e.g., MICHAEL WEINBERG, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, IT WILL BE AWESOME IF THEY
DON’T SCREW IT UP 12 (2010), available at https://www.publicknowledge.org/files/
docs/3DPrintingPaperPublicKnowledge.pdf [hereinafter IT WILL BE AWESOME]
(“Unlike with copyright infringement, the mere possession or downloading of a file is
not enough to create infringement liability.”); Daniel Harris Brean, Asserting Patents to
Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use,” 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
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the first time in the literature, explore whether the patent system
should recognize infringement based on these digital files alone.
Specifically, we explore whether and when digital files that can
directly print operable physical objects might infringe a patent claim
directed to the underlying physical object.19 For example, imagine a
patent containing a claim directed to an improved rocket fuel injector,
but containing no claim to a CAD file capable of printing it. We
explore whether a person might infringe the claim by the
unauthorized creation or distribution of a CAD file that would print
— with no extra assembly required — the exact claimed fuel
injector.20 We refer to this sort of infringement as digital patent
infringement.
ENT. L.J. 771, 790 (2013) [hereinafter Asserting Patents] (“If a patent claims a physical
product, that physical product is what must be sold or offered for sale in order to
satisfy §271(a).”); Nicole A. Syzdek, Five Stages of Patent Grief to Achieve 3D Printing
Acceptance, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 13), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2423571 (“A user’s actions fail to trigger direct infringement
under § 271(a) unless the physical patented product is in fact printed.”); Sam Dillon,
Note, Infringement by Blueprint: Protecting Patent Rights in a World of Low-Cost 3D
Printing, 42 AIPLA Q.J. 425, 443 (2014) (“But direct infringement of a patent covering
an object would not occur when someone creates . . . a [CAD file] of that object.”);
Davis Doherty, Note, Downloading Infringement: Patent Law as a Roadblock to the 3D
Printing Revolution, 26 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 353, 360 (2012) (assuming that a user
would not be “liable for uploading the CAD file, though she may be liable for any
copies of the object that she printed in the process of developing her design”); Charles
W. Finocchiaro, Note, Personal Factory or Catalyst for Piracy? The Hype, Hysteria, and
Hard Realities of Consumer 3-D Printing, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 473, 498
(2013). These commentators have focused their infringement analyses on indirect
infringement.
19 One might draft a patent claim directed to the digital file itself. See Daniel
Harris Brean, Patenting Physibles: A Fresh Perspective for Claiming 3D-Printable
Products, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 13-26), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2560816 (discussing strategies
to claim CAD files themselves); Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 587
n.206; Dillon, supra note 18, at 452-55. But that strategy is not our focus. Whether
such a claim would constitute patentable subject matter is not clear. See infra notes
297–301 and accompanying text. We note, however, that whether claims to CAD files
for inventions should constitute patentable subject matter is relevant to our discussion
in Parts III and IV of whether courts should recognize claims for digital patent
infringement. Generally, if the law should allow claims for digital infringement, it
should allow claims to CAD files stored on a medium. But the law is not always so
clean and symmetrical. Even if such a claim would work, before 3D printing is fully
mature, patentees may not know they need to draft claims covering CAD files, leaving
a potential gap in protection.
20 NASA has used 3D printed rocket fuel injectors. See Press Release, Rachel Kraft,
NASA, NASA Tests Limits of 3-D Printing with Powerful Rocket Engine Check (Aug.
27, 2013), available at http://www.nasa.gov/press/2013/august/nasa-tests-limits-of-3-d-
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Expansion of the patent system to include forms of digital
infringement, however, may generate undesirable costs. For example,
one of the laudable aspects of the system is encouraging subsequent
innovators to “design around” a patented invention — making
changes to their product to avoid infringing a patent. Efforts to design
around a patent may in fact further the progress in the relevant
technological field.21 One way that someone may be able to design
around effectively is to create various computer models and designs
and test them through virtual modeling. Overly robust protection of
DMT could chill this aspect of the patent system.
As patent law confronts digital patent infringement, lawmakers can
look to its sister system — the copyright system — for comparison.
Copyright has been addressing issues of digitization for quite some
time, with illegal downloading and sharing of music challenging
traditional business models for creating music and other forms of
entertainment.
There are important differences, however, between patent law and
copyright law. Copyright law requires actual copying of a work,
whereas patent law merely requires that the item be made, used, sold,
offered to sell, or imported.22 Copying is not required. Further,
copyright law protects a work even if copied in different media.23 The
courts made clear early that a copy of software in computer memory
constitutes a “copy” for infringement purposes because it is in a fixed,
tangible medium.24 Patent law, as one of the most powerful forms of
strict liability, does not have a clear rule that the digital version of a

printing-with-powerful-rocket-engine-check/#.U9EvJlbF9g0.
21 See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called ‘negative incentive’ to
‘design around’ a competitor’s products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a
steady flow of innovations to the marketplace.”).
22 See, e.g., Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in Property
and Patent Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1444 (2013) (“Unlike copyright, patent
does not protect independent inventors from infringement liability.”).
23 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining copies in part as “material objects . . . in
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed”).
24 See MAI v. Peak, 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that a copy in a
computer’s RAM memory “creates a copy under the Copyright Act”); see also NAT’L
COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 13
(1978) (“[T]he placement of a work into a computer is the preparation of a
copy . . . .”). The copyright statue expressly allows an owner of a software copy (e.g., a
CD) to make an additional copy in the computer’s RAM, which is necessary to use the
software. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012).
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physical object is in fact an embodiment of the patented invention.25
The question is whether we should treat digital files in the patent
context in a manner akin to those in copyright.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly introduces 3D
printing and biochemical molecular manufacturing as examples of
DMT. Part II turns to patent law’s indirect infringement regime,
namely induced and contributory infringement. Because scholarly
commentary thus far has focused on the exposure of creators and
distributors of CAD files under patent law’s indirect infringement
regime, Part II reviews the existing commentary and highlights the
flaws in current conceptualizations of indirect infringement. We offer
a novel analysis of indirect infringement’s specific intent requirement
that takes account of a unique phenomenon with DMT: laypeople as
massive indirect infringers. After more than 100 years of indirect
infringement by increasingly sophisticated companies, infringement
will come full circle to its nineteenth-century paradigm of laypeople as
indirect infringers. Having unsophisticated actors contributing to
patent infringement raises novel questions regarding when liability
should attach and whether the inquiry should be objective or
subjective. In addition, Part II recognizes two potentially gaping holes
in the contributory infringement paradigm that stem from the
paradigm’s requirement that an accused infringer sell or offer to sell
(or import) a component of the patented invention.26 First, many
accused infringers will not sell or offer CAD files for sale; they will
give them away, thus potentially escaping liability.27 Second, CAD files
may not constitute “components” of the patented invention, offering
an additional means to avoid liability.
The difficulty of capturing CAD file distributors under indirect
infringement theories risks rendering patentees helpless to redress the
real economic harms they incur. As such, Part III confronts the
potential for there to be direct patent infringement based on the digital
files themselves alone, even absent the actual creation of the object
through a 3D printer. Our analysis contravenes the present
assumption that that making, selling, and offering to sell CAD files
does not constitute direct infringement of a patent claim directed to
the underlying physical object.28 We first explore whether efforts to
commercialize CAD files could and should constitute direct
25

See Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 586-87.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012).
27 We find support in this assertion by analogy to the myriad infringing music and
movie files that have been “shared” around the internet without charging a fee.
28 See supra note 18.
26
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infringement for selling or offering to sell the claimed invention.
Because such commercial activity is an appropriation of the economic
value of the patented invention, we believe the law would and should
recognize such an infringement theory.
What about acts other than selling and offering to sell the
invention? In the future, physical instantiations of complex
mechanical and chemical objects will be a mere press of a button
away. Does it make sense to conclude that someone has not “made”
the invention if they have created a digital file? We take this next,
logical step in Part III and provide a novel exploration of this
potential. On this point, we offer a new analysis that previous
literature has not considered. As mentioned, commentators have all
taken as a given that making the invention requires a physical
instantiation of the invention. We deconstruct and evaluate that
assumption and explore why one could view CAD files as direct
infringement for “making” the claimed invention. Such a rule would
be an extension of current law, with commensurate potential costs
that give us pause.29 Part III then concludes with an analysis of direct
digital infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and shows how
a novel, but in one sense minor, extension of existing doctrine could
allow patentees to capture CAD files as equivalents of physical devices.
In Part IV, we step back to consider the consequences of allowing
direct digital patent infringement theories. Even if as a technological
matter there is little difference between digital files and tangible
objects, there very well may be important policy considerations that
counsel against such an expansion of patent law. The convergence of
the digital and physical worlds also alters some of the basic
presumptions of the patent law regime. As a result, an analysis of
digital patent infringement under current law is an incomplete
inquiry; one must also ask whether digital patent infringement is
desirable in light of the overarching goal to promote the progress of
the useful arts. Part IV begins the critical conversation that must take
place if patent law is to absorb DMT optimally. DMT must be analyzed
in terms of its effects on innovation incentives, follow-on innovation,30
and laypeople and intermediaries. Finally, Part IV highlights the need
to appropriately cabin any doctrinal extensions that arise from DMT to
prevent spillover into other technology areas.

29
30

See infra Part IV.
Follow-on innovation includes innovations that build on earlier innovations.

2015]

Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing
I.

1329

DIGITAL MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY

DMT continues to evolve and change, but the public has become
aware of, if not infatuated with, the quintessential DMT: 3D printing.
3D printing, also called “additive manufacturing,” reverses the normal,
“subtractive” way most objects have traditionally been built. In
subtractive processes, one starts with a solid block and then removes
the undesirable material to yield the desired shape.31 Take sculptures
as an example: a sculptor starts with a block of marble and begins to
chip and cut away the stone, ultimately yielding David. Another
traditional manufacturing method is the use of hollow molds, such as
where a malleable substance is injected into a mold until the substance
solidifies.32 The mold is then removed to yield the desired end
product.33 In contrast to these traditional approaches, 3D printing
builds objects up layer-by-layer, using a print head that emits a solid
or molten material to print each layer.34 After a first layer is printed,
the print head moves up (or the base moves down) and a second layer
is placed on top of the first layer. The process continues until the
object is complete.
To three-dimensionally print, the printer must have instructions.35
These come from a computer file, which for convenience we refer
generically to as a CAD file.36 Someone can create a CAD file from
scratch using a computer program or, alternatively, by scanning an
existing physical object with a scanner that generates a corresponding
CAD file.37 Under either scenario, the CAD file is a digital
representation of the physical object that can be readily printed.
3D printing is rapidly becoming a mainstream technology and has
received attention both in the popular press38 and among legal
31

See Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 558-59.
See generally, e.g., Barr Rubber Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 277 F. Supp. 484,
486-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (discussing patented hollow molding process), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 425 F.2d 1114 (2d. Cir. 1970).
33 Id.
34 See Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 559. 3D printers can use a
variety of materials, including plastics, metals, ceramics, and more. Id.; Peter JensenHaxel, Comment, 3D Printers, Obsolete Firearm Supply Controls, and the Right to Build
Self-Defense Weapons Under Heller, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 447, 451 (2012).
35 See Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 559.
36 Various file formats exist, and currently the most dominant file for 3D printing
purposes is the STL file. Id. at 559-60.
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., The Search for Creative Destruction, GOLDMAN SACHS (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/current/annual-reports/
2013-annual-report-files/search.pdf (describing 3D printing as a disruptive
32
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academics.39 3D printers can already make numerous products,
including shoes,40 human body parts,41 and a working gun.42 3D
printing even took center stage, figuratively and literally, on the TV
show Project Runway, when one contestant printed various accessories
to his fashion designs.43 The technology has and will continue to
develop rapidly,44 allowing the user to print objects made of multiple
materials in one pass, such as working circuits.45
3D printing, however, is not the only form of DMT. Another DMT
of interest is chemical and biological molecular manufacturing. In
these processes, a user builds molecules from constituent atoms or
molecules.46 The concept is similar to 3D printing (and can be
technology); The Third Industrial Revolution, ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21553017 (exploring the future of 3D printing).
39 See, e.g., Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D
Printing and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691 (2014) (discussing the
potential impacts of 3D printing on the future of patent, copyright, and trademark
law); Nora Freeman Engstrom, 3-D Printing and Product Liability: Identifying the
Obstacles, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2013) (discussing the possible impact of 3D
printing on the future of products liability law); Lucas S. Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates, and
the Public: Three-Dimensional Printing Technology and the Arts, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 811
(2014) [hereinafter Art and 3D Printing] (discussing 3D printing and its implications
on laws prohibiting piracy); Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5 (discussing
the impact of 3D printing on products liability, contract, criminal, intellectual
property, and environmental law).
40 See Michael Fitzgerald, With 3-D Printing, the Shoe Really Fits, MIT SLOAN
MGMT. REV. (May 15, 2013), http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/with-3-d-printing-theshoe-really-fits.
41 See Dan Solmon, Listening to the Future with a 3D-Printed Ear, TECHCRUNCH
(May 27, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/05/27/listening-to-the-future-with-a-3dprinted-ear.
42 See Alexis Kleinman, The First 3D-Printed Gun Has Been Fired, HUFFINGTON
POST (May 6, 2013, 10:48 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/06/3dprinted-gun-fired_n_3222669.html.
43 See Michael Molitch-Hou & Danielle Matich, 3DPI Interview with Project
Runway Finalist Justin LeBlanc, 3D PRINTING INDUS. (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://3dprintingindustry.com/2013/11/26/3dpi-interview-project-runway-finalistjustin-leblanc. As an interesting (to us) aside, LeBlanc teaches at NC State University,
the undergraduate alma mater of one of us and just down the road from the law
school of the other.
44 See HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, FABRICATED: THE NEW WORLD OF 3D PRINTING
84 (2013).
45 See Amit Joe Lopes et al., Integrating Stereolithography and Direct Print
Technologies for 3D Structural Electronics Fabrication, 18 RAPID PROTOTYPING J. 129,
129-33 (2012).
46 See J.P. Renault et al., Fabricating Arrays of Single Protein Molecules on Glass
Using Microcontact Printing, 107 J. PHYSICAL CHEM. B 703, 703-04 (2003) (describing a
microcontact printing method for printing proteins and protein arrays); Press Release,
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considered a subset of 3D printing) though the scale and print
materials differ. Although the technology is in its infancy, the goal is
to manufacture molecules, cells, and systems from digital files akin to
the CAD files used with 3D printing.47
Much of the attention paid to DMT technologies has focused on the
printers themselves.48 As their costs fall,49 printers increasingly will be
available to everyday users in the same way laser printers went from
being high-end products to common items found on nearly everyone’s
desktop.50 What is underappreciated, however, is the CAD files’
crucial role in DMT. A CAD file is not merely an impotent blueprint of
the physical device. Rather, it is a powerful tool that, in a world of
ubiquitous 3D printers, renders the possessor of the file just as
satisfied as if he possessed the physical object itself. The physical
object is merely a button press (and a bit of time and print material)
away. Such simplicity differs significantly from a blueprint, which
requires skill to build the described structure.
By way of analogy, consider a calculator. In years past, a calculator
connoted a physical object one kept on a desk or in a backpack.
Today, calculators are simple apps residing on a person’s smart phone.
Ask someone with a smart phone if she has a calculator, and she says,
“yes,” even though she only has a file that when loaded into the
Nat’l Sci. Found., Drag-and-Drop DNA (Dec. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=125990 (describing technology
that allows one to “‘print,’ molecule by molecule, exactly the [desired] compound”
and “to rapidly, and precisely, specify the placement of every atom in a compound”).
47 See generally Priscilla E.M. Purnick & Ron Weiss, The Second Wave of Synthetic
Biology: From Modules to Systems, 10 NATURE REVS. MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 410, 41215 (2009) (describing efforts to combine basic biomodules into systems-level circuitry);
Bioprinting: Printing a Bit of Me, ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.
economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21598322-bioprinting-building-living-tissue3d-printer-becoming-new-business (describing computer-controlled 3D printers that
print live cells); Roff Smith, Just Press Print, NAT’L GEOG., Dec. 2014, at 112, 126 (noting
use of 3D printing to print blood vessels); Kyle Maxey, 3D Printing Martian DNA?,
(Oct.
09,
2013),
http://www.engineering.com/3DPrinting/
ENGINEERING.COM
3DPrintingArticles/ArticleID/6443/3D-Printing-Martian-DNA.aspx (discussing potential
to 3D print synthetic DNA).
48 See, e.g., Depoorter, supra note 14 (discussing impact of 3D printers on all
intellectual property); Desai & Magliocca, supra note 39 (focusing on impact of 3D
printers).
49 See Agam Shah, 3D Printer Price Drops Could Lure Home Users, PCWORLD (April
4, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2140360/3d-printer-price-dropscould-lure-home-users.html.
50 See George Cox, Laser Printer Costs Drop, THE SPECTRUM (Sept. 22, 2014, 5:55
PM), http://www.thespectrum.com/story/life/features/mesquite/2014/09/22/laser-printercosts-drop/16077397/.
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phone’s RAM gives her the functions of a calculator. It is largely the
same for one who possesses a CAD file of a physical object: assuming
you have the print material, a press of the “print” button produces the
physical object.
Like MP3 files before them, the impact of CAD files multiplies
exponentially because of their reproducibility and transferability.51
Like any other file, they can be copied, emailed, posted online, and
downloaded from the Internet. The upshot is that one can essentially
multiply and share physical objects across the globe. This is great
news for the remote village that can print a replacement part for a
broken water pump.52 But it is worrisome for the patent holder that
fears widespread, decentralized creation of her patented invention.
Just like the digitization of music allowed massive and largely
anonymous copyright infringement, the digitization of things will be
of considerable concern to patent holders.
II.

THE OBVIOUS POLICY LEVER: INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT

The most basic form of infringement under the Patent Act is found
in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which defines infringement as arising when
someone without authorization makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or
imports the patented invention.53 Anyone who uses a 3D printer or
equivalent to print a patented device would be directly infringing
because she has made the device without authorization. In theory, the
patent owner could sue such people for patent infringement.
But such a strategy may be rather impractical. First, given how
diffuse the printers may be, it may be difficult for the patent owner to
identify who these infringers are. Second, even if the patent owner
identifies the infringers — who are probably geographically dispersed
— the owner may have to sue each infringer separately, either because

51 Cf. Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913
(2005) (noting that “billions of files” were shared on peer-to-peer networks each
month); Deven R. Desai, The New Steam: On Digitization, Decentralization, and
Disruption, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1469, 1471-73, 1475 (2014) (illustrating implications of
new technology, such as 3D printing, using peer-to-peer MP3 file sharing and noting
how disruptive MP3 files were to the music industry).
52 See J.M. Pearce et al., 3-D Printing of Open Source Appropriate Technologies for
Self-Directed Sustainable Development, 3 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 17, 18 (2010) (describing
the possibilities for 3D printers to assist people in developing countries).
53 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). There are other forms of direct infringement as well.
See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritorial Consequences of
Akamai, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 502 n.20 (2012) [hereinafter Consequences of
Akamai] (discussing § 271(e)–(g)).
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of joinder rules54 or personal jurisdiction requirements.55 Finally, the
patent owner would ultimately be suing a potential customer,
someone who may want to buy the patented item. The music industry
faced this scenario when illegal digital music downloads began.56
Ultimately, the industry did sue illegal downloaders, or at least those
engaged in massive downloads, to set an example.57 Such a strategy,
however, may not be effective, and it risks alienating future customers
and creating a public relations nightmare.58
To combat some of these problems, patent law affords protection to
patent owners against indirect infringement, which arises when a third
party is held liable for the acts of others who are directly infringing the
patent.59 Holding such indirect infringers liable helps to protect patent
owners when the direct infringers may be large in number, diffuse,
and perhaps unable to pay.60 The Patent Act provides two forms of
indirect infringement: active inducement of infringement under §
271(b) and contributory infringement under § 271(c).61 Active
inducement is vaguely defined in the statute, though it is clear
Congress intended to codify the common law that had developed prior
to the adoption of the 1952 Patent Act.62 With respect to DMT, one
could consider the printer to be the genesis of the potential indirect
liability, since it ultimately produces the patented invention.63 Thus,
54 See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012). For an excellent discussion of the new joinder
provisions, see generally David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652
(2013).
55 For a leading case interpreting personal jurisdiction, see Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
56 See Hughes, supra note 14, at 725-29.
57 Copyright owners had the subpoena power under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) that allowed them easily to identify downloaders via their
ISP address. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2012). This power is specific to copyright owners
and would not be available to patent owners, further complicating the ability of a
patent owner to sue persons printing their invention directly. In addition, courts have
read § 512(h) such that it does not apply to files located on peer-to-peer networks. See
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229, 1233
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
58 See RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 30,
2008), https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later.
59 Id. at 401.
60 See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA
CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 400-01 (2006) [hereinafter Induced Infringement].
61 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c) (2012).
62 See Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent
Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 370 (2006).
63 See Depoorter, supra note 14, at 1496 (discussing indirect liability based on 3D
printers).
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patent owners may want to go after the manufacturers of the printers
as indirect infringers. This avenue, however, would not bear fruit for
patent owners. Both forms of indirect infringement require knowledge
of the relevant patent. Because 3D printers are generic — they print
whatever the CAD file tells them to print — it is highly unlikely the
manufacturers of the printers would ever be liable for indirect
infringement.
The CAD files, however, are quite different. These files are specific
to a particular item and thus potentially to a specific patented
invention. Indirect infringement theories are the most obvious avenue
for patentees under current law because they do not turn on the
difficult question of whether the CAD file itself infringes the patent
covering the physical invention. Instead, liability arises for a party
when she facilitates the infringement of someone else, such as when a
third party makes an infringing item from the CAD file.64 Webpages
already exist where people can buy CAD files or download them for
free.65 Just as in the digital music context, people can use peer-to-peer
networks to share files66 that they have either purchased or created on
their own.67
It is thus unsurprising that the majority of commentators to analyze
whether digital files can infringe patent claims have focused almost
exclusively on indirect infringement theories. Indeed, these
commentators simply assume without discussion that direct
infringement lawsuits based on the CAD files alone are not viable.68 In
this section, we too address the possibility for indirect infringement
based on CAD files. Our analysis reveals complexities not yet
discussed in the literature. As we explain, patent holders likely will be
dissatisfied with indirect infringement claims against digital files.
Nevertheless, as we address in Part III, we do not join those previous
64 See Holbrook, Induced Infringement, supra note 60, at 400 (“Liability for active
inducement of infringement and contributory infringement are variations of thirdparty liability, where one party is held liable for the directly infringing acts of
others.”).
65 See, e.g., 3D BURRITO, http://3dburrito.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2014);
THINGIVERSE, http://www.thingiverse.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2014).
66 Ernesto, Pirate Bay Takes over Distribution of Censored 3D Printable Gun,
TORRENTFREAK (May 10, 2013), https://torrentfreak.com/pirate-bay-takes-over-distributionof-censored-3d-printable-gun-130510.
67 This is another significant difference from the copyright context. Where most of
the music and movie files had to be copied from the original copyrighted work, people
can sometimes generate CAD files by scanning an object, and they may not be aware
that the object is patented or part of a patented item.
68 See supra note 18.
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commentators who have rejected the possibility of direct infringement
claims based on the CAD files themselves.
Claims for indirect infringement could arise in at least two common
scenarios. First, an individual could create69 or otherwise obtain a
digital file and transfer that file directly or indirectly to someone who
prints the infringing physical object. Second, a website, peer-to-peer
network, or other network could host a digital file, allowing others to
access the file and print the infringing object. We explore these
scenarios as we discuss patent law’s two forms of indirect
infringement: active inducement of infringement and contributory
infringement.
A. Active Inducement of Infringement Under § 271(b)
A person is liable as an indirect infringer when she “actively induces
infringement.”70 To prove active inducement, a patent holder must
demonstrate the following elements: (1) direct infringement; (2)
specific intent to induce a third party to infringe; and (3) an
affirmative act by the inducer.71
As will be shown, digital infringement creates unique problems for a
patent holder’s ability to enforce its patent through active inducement.
First, the patentee must prove that the alleged inducement actually
led to an act of direct infringement.72 In the context of 3D printing, for
example, the patentee would have to show by direct or circumstantial
evidence that the accused inducer provided access to a CAD file that

69

Either by scanning an object or designing it from scratch on a computer.
See 35 U.S.C. §271(b) (2012).
71 See KIMBERLY A. MOORE, TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK & JOHN F. MURPHY, PATENT
LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 452 (West 4th ed. 2013).
72 See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2115
(2014) (“This case presents the question whether a defendant may be liable for
inducing infringement of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) when no one has directly
infringed the patent under § 271(a) or any other statutory provision. The statutory
text and structure and our prior case law require that we answer this question in the
negative.”); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341-42
(1961) (“[T]here can be no contributory infringement in the absence of a direct
infringement.”); i4i Ltd. P’ship. v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 850 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“To succeed on a theory of contributory or induced infringement, [the patent
owner] was required to show direct infringement of the . . . patent.”), aff’d, 131 S. Ct.
2238 (2011); Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1033
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Upon a failure of proof of direct infringement, any claim of
inducement of infringement also fails. A finding of contributory infringement likewise
requires underlying proof of direct infringement.” (citation omitted)); Joy Techs., Inc.
v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
70
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another person downloaded and printed.73 Proving this kind of direct
infringement can be difficult because of the relative anonymity of the
internet. Discovering who has downloaded a file often requires a
difficult and lengthy discovery process, as shown by digital music
litigation.74 Moreover, in copyright law, the mere act of downloading
the song is an act of infringement. Under current understanding of
patent law,75 the act of direct infringement would be the printing of
the patented item, constituting an infringing “making” of the patented
invention.76 As such, the patentee must prove that the downloader
actually printed the object. Although obtaining such proof is not
impossible, it certainly can be difficult and costly.77 The patentee’s
burden may be lightened somewhat because it can prove the
underlying direct infringement with circumstantial evidence.78 What

73 But see Finnsugar Bioproducts, Inc. v. Raytheon Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc.,
No. 97 C 8746, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15965, at *10-11 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that
claims for contributory infringement based on an offer to sell need not show that the
actual sale has occurred and that the patentee meets the “direct infringement pleading
requirement by pleading that a sale will occur sometime in the future”). Without
directly citing Finnsugar, the Federal Circuit has abrogated it. See In re Bill of Lading
Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“[Plaintiff] is incorrect that a party could be liable for contributory
infringement even if no one has yet directly infringed the patent in question.”).
74 See Sean B. Karunaratne, Note, The Case Against Combating BitTorrent Piracy
Through Mass John Doe Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 111 MICH. L. REV. 283, 286-88
(2012) (describing the process of obtaining IP addresses, filing “John Doe” lawsuits on
the basis of the addresses, and then seeking subpoenas to discover the person behind
the IP address).
75 An understanding that we challenge below.
76 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
77 One way to determine the identity would be for the patentee to determine an IP
address that was used to download a file. See Karunaratne, supra note 74, at 286-88.
Using that IP address, the patentee would file a John Doe lawsuit to determine the true
identity of the downloader. See id. at 287. Then the patentee would need to somehow
prove that the person who downloaded the file actually printed it, either through an
admission or some other avenue, thereby making the invention pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a).
78 Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (vacating summary judgment in part based on circumstantial evidence of direct
infringement); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (finding no clear error in the district court’s finding that the patentee “had met
its burden of showing infringement under section 271(b) with circumstantial evidence
of extensive puzzle sales, dissemination of an instruction sheet teaching the method of
restoring the preselected pattern with each puzzle, and the availability of a solution
booklet on how to solve the puzzle”).
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constitutes sufficient circumstantial evidence, however, is uncertain,79
especially in the uncharted arena of CAD files.
Second, the accused inducer must also have the requisite mental
state — the intent to induce acts of infringement.80 This intent
element requires actual knowledge of the patent or willful blindness of
the patent’s existence.81 Assuming the patentee can prove the
underlying act of direct infringement, she also must prove the accused
inducer actively encouraged the direct infringer with “knowledge that
79 The courts have struggled with how to prove infringement through
circumstantial evidence, particularly with respect to software-implemented inventions.
For example, in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed
the holding of no direct infringement where the accused software method was only
used by the media player when the primary, non-infringing method failed. 543 F.3d
710, 723 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The patentee “did not show specific instances of direct
infringement” where the infringing software method had actually run, but instead
relied on expert testimony that the failure of the non-infringing method was “very
common.” Id. Similarly, in ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Manufacturing Co., the
court confronted the situation where the accused device could be operated in either of
two modes, one infringing and one not. 501 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The
court found no infringement, reasoning “to prove direct infringement, a patentee must
either point to specific instances of direct infringement or show that the accused
device necessarily infringes the patent in suit.” Id.
In contrast, the Federal Circuit affirmed a judgment of direct infringement in Lucent
Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. See 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub
nom. Microsoft Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3324 (2010). In Lucent, the
accused software method required a user of a computer program, such as Microsoft
Office, to utilize the patented date-picker function instead of the non-patented typing
method. Id. Despite no specific evidence of an individual act of infringement, the court
affirmed the holding of infringement because “circumstantial evidence was just
adequate to permit a jury to find that at least one other person within the United
States during the relevant time period, other than the expert, had performed the
claimed method,” noting that the accused indirect infringer included instructions to
customers regarding how to use both the infringing and non-infringing methods. Id.
Because CAD files may have uses other than merely printing, these cases suggest
courts may require evidence of specific acts of direct infringement. Undeniably, issues
of what evidence, particularly circumstantial evidence, is sufficient to prove direct
infringement will arise in litigation.
80 See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011)
(“Accordingly, we now hold that induced infringement under § 271(b) requires
knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.”); see also DSU Med.
Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304-06 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part)
(“[I]nducement requires evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging
another’s infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct
infringer’s activities.”).
81 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068-69. To show willful blindness, a patentee must
demonstrate “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high
probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to
avoid learning of that fact.” Id. at 2070.
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the induced acts constitute[d] patent infringement.”82 This necessarily
means that the accused inducer has knowledge of the patent.
This scienter requirement significantly limits the ability of patent
owners to sue actors for active inducement. For instance, CAD file
creators may be unsophisticated actors, unfamiliar with patents and
patent law.83 Patent law, thus far, has not had to wrestle much with
laypeople as accused inducers. Before DMT, the quintessential inducer
was a relatively wealthy company that had access to sophisticated legal
counsel.84 Now, accused inducers will include passive websites hosting
CAD files and numerous individuals who transfer files to others.85 In
essence, indirect infringement will enter an era of unsophisticated (in
a patent law sense) inducers, which raises significant new legal and
policy issues.
The copyright system, of course, has encountered some of this
dynamic with infringing digital downloads. The Supreme Court even
imported active inducement from patent law into the copyright system
in Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.86 But, in Grokster,
the requisite intent was apparent. As the Supreme Court noted, each of
the defendant’s entire existence was about facilitating the peer-to-peer
transfer of copyrighted works.87 Indeed, the Court concluded, “[t]he
unlawful objective is unmistakable.”88 The result is not surprising
given that everyone effectively knows music is subject to copyright.
The situation differs significantly in the patent context because
people often have little to no appreciation that objects are patented.
The strict knowledge requirement will make it difficult for patentees

82

See id. at 2068.
The actual manufacturers of 3D printers and scanners likely are sophisticated
actors, but they also likely would not satisfy the knowledge requirement given that, in
theory, every patent that involves a material object could arguably be created by a 3D
printer. It is unlikely they would be viewed as even being willfully ignorant in that
context. Willful ignorance, which is a form of knowledge, is more particularized than
general knowledge that a patent out there, somewhere, may cover the produced item.
See id. at 2070.
84 Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U.
L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2011) (“Accused inducers of infringement are not individuals and
small companies but giant, multi-national corporations.”).
85 For an example of a website that hosts user-generated content for others to
share, see THINGIVERSE, supra note 65.
86 See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005); see also
Holbrook, Induced Infringement, supra note 60, at 402-04 (discussing Grokster and its
relationship to patent law).
87 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937-40.
88 Id. at 940.
83
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to hold inducers liable.89 If the accused inducer independently created
the infringing object and did not know of the patent, there will
obviously be no knowledge on the part of the accused inducer. Even if
the accused inducer copies an object that is marked with a patent
number product, the mere marking of a product — unnoticed by the
inducer — is not sufficient to impute knowledge.90 At a minimum,
patent owners will need to police activities more rigorously and likely
send various notice letters to trigger the requisite knowledge on the
part of many lay infringers.91
Even after an accused inducer has actual notice of a patent, her
“good faith” belief that the patent is invalid or that the printed item
does not infringe the patent negates the requisite intent, immunizing
them from liability92 (at least for past infringement).93 Thus, sending
89 Some accused inducers might plausibly argue that although they transferred the
CAD file, they did not intend for it to be printed, thus negating the intent to infringe.
90 This is true even when the accused is a business rather than an individual. See
Mendenhall v. Astec Indus., Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1134, 1137 (E.D. Tenn. 1988)
(“While [the patentee] argued vigorously . . . that the word ‘knowingly’ as used in
[Section 271(c)] included constructive knowledge of the patent, it was unable to
produce any case law to support that position.”), aff’d per curium, 891 F.2d 299 (Fed.
Cir. 1989); Celotex Corp. v. V.E. Power Door Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q. 636, 639 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (rejecting an argument that constructive knowledge of a patent is sufficient and
stating that, under Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S.
476 (1964), and stating “there can be no question that . . . actual knowledge is
required under § 271(c)”). Contra Brean, Asserting Patents, supra note 18, at 796
(assuming that “any deliberate copying, rendering, or 3D scanning of a product
marked with a United States patent number should suffice” to show scienter).
91 See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488-90
(1964) (stating that receipt of letter from patentee alleging infringement was sufficient
to impute knowledge of the patent and infringement).
92 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(“We now hold that evidence of an accused inducer’s good-faith belief of [patent]
invalidity may negate the requisite intent for induced infringement.”). The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in this case on the question of whether a defendant’s
belief that a patent is invalid is a defense to induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. §
271(b). See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 752, 752 (2014); see also
Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding that a
reasonable belief of non-infringement supported a jury verdict that the defendant
lacked the intent required for induced infringement); DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471
F.3d 1293, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding a demonstrated belief of non-infringement
sufficient to support a jury verdict that the defendant did not induce infringement).
93 Arguably, during litigation, if the patent is found not invalid and infringed, then
that belief has been negated. The accused inducer should be enjoined from inducing
ongoing infringing activity, or to pay an ongoing royalty rate. See Holbrook, Induced
Infringement, supra note 60, at 406 (“The shield from liability would only be
retrospective, however. The indirect infringer should not be immunized from
prospective relief if her belief is later shown to be unfounded at trial.”); see also
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notice letters may result in the accused obtaining such an opinion of
counsel, further complicating enforcement. A legitimate opinion of
counsel opining that the patent is invalid or not infringed would
certainly provide “good faith” sufficient to avoid inducement.94 But
opinions of counsel are expensive, and laypeople may not even know
they need one or how to get one. Thus, the question remains, what is
the scope of good faith in the absence of legal counsel?
Suppose that a layperson with actual notice of a patent studies it
closely but erroneously concludes without advice of counsel that it is
invalid or not infringed. Is “good faith” purely a subjective inquiry
into the mind of the accused, or is there an objective element?95 Does
the answer differ depending on whether the infringer is a layperson or
a business?96 Before 3D printing and other DMT, the vast majority of
Rantanen, supra note 84, at 1603 n.162.
94 See Bettcher Indus. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 649 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(finding opinion of counsel regarding non-infringement “admissible, at least with
respect to [defendant]’s state of mind and its bearing on indirect infringement”).
95 Professor Rantanen, in his excellent exploration of fault in the indirect
infringement context, points to Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660
(Fed. Cir. 1988), as suggesting that the Federal Circuit applies an objective
component to the intent to induce inquiry. Rantanen, supra note 84, at 1621. He
states, “the Federal Circuit concluded that despite a letter evidencing the accused
indirect infringer’s subjective belief that his composition did not infringe the patent,
the objective evidence . . . supported the [judge’s] conclusion that such a belief was
objectively unreasonable.” Id. (emphasis added).
Professor Rantanen overstates his point slightly. The court did not clearly adopt an
objective component for intent; it was reviewing a lower decision for clear error. It is
an equally fair reading of the case that the court allowed the district court to use “all
of the circumstances” — including objective evidence — to decide whether it believed
the defendant as to asserted subjective belief. See Water Techs., 850 F.2d at 668-69
(stating that the defendant’s evidence was “not such clear evidence of intent that the
district court could not make a contrary finding” and “[t]he requisite intent to induce
infringement may be inferred from all of the circumstances”).
96 Support for such a distinction can be found in the original version of Article 1
of the U.C.C., which embraced a distinction between sophisticated actors
(“merchants” under U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2000)) and mere laypeople (non-merchants)
regarding what constitutes good faith. Good faith for non-merchants meant only
subjective good faith. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (2000) (defining good faith for nonmerchants as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned”). Good faith
for merchants required subjective and objective good faith. Id. § 2-103(1)(b) (2001)
(defining good faith for merchants as “honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade”). The revised Article 1 of
the U.C.C. abolished the subjective-only test for non-merchants. See id. § 1201(b)(20) (2001). However, many states either have not adopted revised Article 1 or
have adopted it without that particular change. Keith A. Rowley, UCC Legislative
Update, UCC LAW (Mar. 2, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://ucclaw.blogspot.com/2010/03/ucclegislative-update.html (“Of the 37 enacting states, 26 have adopted the uniform
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inducing infringers were large companies,97 but DMT potentially will
expose numerous individuals to accusations of inducement. A purely
subjective test would render enforcement exceedingly difficult because
patent law is so esoteric and specialized that a layperson could
innocently misunderstand — or plausibly assert that he
misunderstood — the law any number of ways.98 Even if the test has
an objective element, if it is tied to what a reasonable layperson might
understand, patent law’s complexity could effectively insulate many
laypeople from inducement.99
Although there is some uncertainty as to whether the test for actual
knowledge of infringement will be objective or subjective (though we
believe it is subjective), it is clear that where willful blindness is used
to show knowledge, a subjective test is used. The Supreme Court has
recently stated that willful blindness requires a threshold finding that
the accused inducer first subjectively believes there is a high
probability of infringement.100 Proving such a mindset will be difficult.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit, in the comparable context of willful
infringement, has suggested that a layperson’s subjective views will
not negate intent.101 When someone knows of a patent and infringes

definition, while 11 have retained the pre-revised definition.”).
97 See Rantanen, supra note 84, at 1580.
98 See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 72, 119 (2012) (“[T]he only parties that are liable for inducing such infringement
are those that have actively engaged in the patent system and have awareness of the
patent and a belief that the activity they are inducing is infringing. Such actors must be
quite familiar with the patent system and law to form such an intent.” (emphasis
added)). Indirect infringement focuses on the actor’s appreciation of the legal (as
opposed to factual) consequences of a given act. See Rantanen, supra note 84, at 161720. And a layperson will be virtually helpless to make those determinations accurately.
Determining the merit of a claim for patent infringement is generally much more
difficult in the patent context than the copyright context. The accused inducer must
wrestle with claim construction, the doctrine of equivalents, and obviousness, among
other difficult areas of patent law. What chance does a layperson have of construing
claims correctly if district courts cannot do so a large percentage of the time? See, e.g.,
Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005) (reporting the reversal rate for
appealed claim terms from 1996 to 2003 was 34.5%).
99 See Rantanen, supra note 84, at 1615 (“But the only way to actually know that
conduct infringes a patent is to interpret the claims and conduct in an infringement
analysis. Even then, one cannot be ‘practically certain’ that conduct infringes a patent
— the only way to know for sure is to have a court make a final determination.”).
100 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011).
101 See generally In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(en banc) (“The state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective
inquiry.”).
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anyway, she may be viewed as a willful patent infringer.102 When
infringement is willful, a court can enhance damages up to treble the
compensatory amount.103 To prove willful infringement, the patent
owner must demonstrate: (1) “that the infringer acted despite an
objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of
a valid patent”; and (2) “that this objectively-defined risk (determined
by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either
known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused
infringer.”104 The second prong of the willfulness test contains an
objective requirement, namely, that the infringer “should have
known” of the risk. Thus, for willful infringement, a mere subjective
belief of non-infringement will not negate intent. If the infringer has a
good faith belief that the patent claim is invalid or not infringed, then
generally there is no willful infringement.105 This belief negates the
required scienter for willful infringement just as it does for induced

102 See generally id. (creating an “objective recklessness” standard for willful
infringement, in which a reckless person is one who knows of an unjustifiably high
risk of harm and acts anyway).
103 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three
times the amount found or assessed.”).
104 Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. The continued vitality of this test for willfulness is in
doubt. The Supreme Court recently rejected the Federal Circuit’s test for fee-shifting
when a case is “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON
Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756-58 (2014); see also Highmark Inc. v.
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748-49 (2014) (rejecting de novo
review of exceptional case determination in light of new standard). Given the link
between fee-shifting in § 285 and the enhancement of damages under § 284, two
Federal Circuit judges have called for the court to reconsider Seagate. See Halo Elecs.,
Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1383-86 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J.,
concurring, joined by Hughes, J.). The Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court,
therefore, may change the Seagate standard.
105 See, e.g., Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“Thus a competent opinion of counsel concluding either that DirecTV did not
infringe the ’505 patent or that it was invalid would provide a sufficient basis for
DirecTV to proceed without engaging in objectively reckless behavior.”); Wechsler v.
Macke Int’l Trade, Inc., 486 F.3d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“A primary
consideration for willful infringement, on the other hand, is whether the infringer had
a good faith belief that the patent was invalid and/or not infringed.”); Jurgens v. CBK,
Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[W]here one continues his infringing
activity, and fails to investigate and determine, in good faith, that he possesses
reasonable defenses to an accusation of patent infringement, the infringement is in
bad faith. Such conduct occurs when an infringer merely copies a patented invention,
or where he obtains incompetent, conclusory opinions of counsel only to use as a
shield against a later charge of willful infringement, rather than in a good faith attempt
to avoid infringing another’s patent.”).
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infringement.106 But this belief must be based on a competent opinion
of counsel, suggesting that there is an objective aspect to this
inquiry.107 If the Federal Circuit follows the willfulness doctrine’s
objective requirement, it will require lay inducers to seek sophisticated
opinions of counsel.108
Finally, the third element for inducement requires that the accused
inducer actively induced infringement.109 The Supreme Court has
stated that “[t]he term ‘induce’ means ‘[t]o lead on; to influence; to
prevail on; to move by persuasion or influence.’ The addition of the
adverb ‘actively’ suggests that the inducement must involve the taking
of affirmative steps to bring about the desired result.”110
It seems clear that the inducer needs to have transferred or hosted
the CAD file with the specific intent that it be printed,111 but it is not

106 See Holbrook, Induced Infringement, supra note 60, at 405-06 (comparing
willfulness and inducement); Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 UC
DAVIS L. REV. 225, 240 n.70 (2005) [hereinafter Inducing Patent Infringement].
107 See Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 810 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting
that willfulness can still be found when opinion of counsel is incompetent). For
example, the Federal Circuit offered the following explanation in Golden Blount, Inc. v.
Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2006):

The district court did not clearly err in dismissing Peterson’s asserted good-faith
belief in non-infringement, and thus in finding willfulness. Peterson made littleto-no effort to assess whether it infringed or whether the patent was invalid
after receiving notice of the patent. The district court did not clearly err in
according little weight to the first two oral opinions rendered by McLaughlin in
light of the fact that McLaughlin did not have, and therefore could not have
considered, the prosecution history or the accused device when the opinions
were given . . . . Finally, the district court did not clearly err in inferring that
Peterson demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward Golden Blount’s patent rights
from the facts that Peterson did not respond substantively to Golden Blount’s
notice letters and that it only sought a thorough opinion of counsel after suit
was filed, and then only out of a concern to avoid a willfulness finding and a
possible judgment for attorney fees.
108 That said, the standard for willfulness differs somewhat from the inducement
context. To prove willfulness, the patent owner must show “that the infringer acted
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a
valid patent” and that “that this objectively-defined risk (determined by the record
developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it
should have been known to the accused infringer.” Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
109 See MOORE, HOLBROOK & MURPHY, supra note 71, at 452.
110 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2011).
111 DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc as
to Section III.B of the opinion) (holding en banc that inducement requires that the
alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed “specific intent” to
encourage another’s infringement).
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clear what is required to show the specific intent. For example, must
the inducer have taken an “affirmative step” beyond merely uploading
or transferring the file, such as urging that the file be printed?
Although a person often hosts or transfers a CAD file so that it can be
printed, that may not be true every time. Someone might share a file
simply so others could view the digital version, or so that people in
countries where the object is not patented could print it. What if
someone posts a CAD file with a large disclaimer reading: “Do not
print in any country where printing will infringe a patent!”? Will such
a disclaimer protect the accused inducer from liability? Or, instead,
would the negative command actually suggest to the direct infringer
that they should print.112 In other words, metaphorically, does a sign
saying “don’t push the button” actually lead people to push the
button?
Due to these various legal and practical limitations, patent owners
will have considerable difficulty using active inducement of patent
infringement under § 271(b) to stop or prevent the distribution of
CAD files. Although active inducement is designed to protect patent
owners in the context of diffuse infringement, we believe that patent
owners likely will need to pursue some other avenue.
B. Contributory Infringement Under § 271(c)
Active inducement under § 271(b) is not the only form of indirect
infringement under the patent statute. When Congress adopted
§ 271(b) and (c), it codified common law that had developed. Section
271(c) represented the most common form of indirect infringement113
112 Cf. Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293,
1312-14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding a genuine issue of material fact around the accused
inducer’s specific intent because defendant’s “field bulletins” instructed users to
configure the device in a non-infringing manner, but an employee of the defendant
testified that he instructed users to configure the device however “they feel
comfortable,” which might involve an infringing configuration); Lifescan, Inc. v. CanAm Care Corp., 859 F. Supp. 392, 396 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding a genuine issue of
material fact existed regarding inducement because the “fact that [the accused]
provides the warning [against configuring in an infringing manner] to consumers does
not equate with the fact that the consumers, in fact, understand and heed the
warning”).
113 See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066 (“Cases in the latter category — i.e., cases in
which a party sold an item that was not itself covered by the claims of a patent but
that enabled another party to make or use a patented machine, process, or
combination — were more common.”); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.,
909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The most common pre-1952 contributory
infringement cases dealt with the situation where a seller would sell a component
which was not itself technically covered by the claims of a product or process patent
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and § 271(b) covered all other forms.114 Thus, the two provisions,
though distinct, are related.115
A person is liable for contributory infringement when the following
conditions are satisfied: (1) someone offers to sell, sells, or imports
into the United States (2) a component of a patented device (3)
knowing the component to be especially adapted for use in an
infringement of a patent with no substantial non-infringing uses (4)
resulting in an act of direct infringement.116
Unlike active inducement under § 271(b), there is no requirement
that the infringer have an “intent to cause infringement.” Instead, the
law requires knowledge of the patent and knowledge that the
component is especially adapted for the patent.117 Because the accused
contributory infringer is aware of the patent and that the component
has no substantial non-infringing uses, intent is presumed — what
other use could the component have except to infringe?118 Thus, the
two provisions differ because one can be an active inducer of
infringement even if some acts could be non-infringing, as was the
case in the analogous copyright scenario in Grokster.119
The first requirement — that someone sell, offer to sell, or import a
component — bears further exploration. Commentators discussing
§ 271(c) in the context of CAD files have focused their attention on
whether the CAD file is a “component.”120 But an additional,

but which had no other use except with the claimed product or process.”).
114 Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469 (“Section 271(b) codified the prohibition
against all other types of activity which, prior to 1952, had constituted ‘contributory
infringement.’”); see Adams, supra note 62, at 370; Lemley, Inducing Patent
Infringement, supra note 106, at 227.
115 See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2065-68 (using § 271(c) precedent to interpret
§ 271(b)).
116 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012). In addition, the component must be a material
part of the invention, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use. Id.
117 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964)
(“On this question a majority of the Court is of the view that [§] 271(c) does require a
showing that the alleged contributory infringer knew that the combination for which
his component was especially designed was both patented and infringing.”).
118 See Holbrook, Induced Infringement, supra note 60, at 408.
119 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005).
120 See, e.g., Brean, Asserting Patents, supra note 18, at 796-800 (arguing that CAD
files are not “components” under § 271(c)); cf. William R. Thornewell II, Note, Patent
Infringement Prevention and the Advancement of Technology: Application of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f) to Software and “Virtual Components,” 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2815, 2833-43
(2005) (analyzing the potential judicial treatment of CAD files as “components” under
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)).
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unexplored question is how to interpret the requirement that the
infringer “sells” or “offers to sell” the component. The Federal Circuit
has interpreted “offer to sell” under § 271(a) “according to the norms
of traditional contractual analysis,”121 meaning that an offer must
constitute a “manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so
made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to
that bargain is invited and will conclude it.”122 The Federal Circuit’s
contract-law definition for an “offer” has been criticized.123 Part of the
criticism relates to the definition’s exclusion of most advertisements
and solicitations,124 which can cause harm to the patentee in the form
of price erosion.125
Importantly, the Federal Circuit has held that the term “sale”
excludes at least some transactions where the infringing item is
donated or otherwise given away for free.126 Although this
interpretation may be correct as a matter of plain meaning, the fact
121

Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1257 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1979)).
123 See, e.g., Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 791-92 (criticizing the
Federal Circuit’s contract-law offer standard for, among other things, failing to
account for price erosion from advertisements of infringing products); Lucas S.
Osborn, The Leaky Common Law: An “Offer to Sell” as a Policy Tool in Patent Law and
Beyond, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 143, 169-91, 196-99 (2013) [hereinafter Offer to Sell]
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s contract-law offer standard for failing to account for
price erosion and for failing to properly interpret the statutory language and relevant
Supreme Court case law).
124 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 798-99; Osborn, Offer to Sell,
supra note 123, at 150.
125 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 791-92 (indicating that the
damage to the patentee is the lost profit caused by the drop in price because but for
the infringing offer to sell, the patentee could have sold the item at a higher price); cf.
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617
F.3d 1296, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that “the damages that would flow from
an unaccepted offer to sell and an actual sale would likely be quite different” (citing
Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 791-92)). Price erosion refers to the
downward price pressure on patented goods when a competitor signals to the market
that it will offer a competing (often infringing) good, since the market expects the
patentee to lower its price to compete with the infringer. See Osborn, Offer to Sell,
supra note 123, at 174-76.
126 HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding,
in the personal jurisdiction context, that “a mere offer to donate, where a donation is
never made, cannot be an offer for sale” under § 271(a)); see also Holbrook, Threat of
a Sale, supra note 9, at 766. That said, some efforts to give something away for “free”
may nevertheless be a “sale” because some sort of consideration is exchanged. Cf.
LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1374-77 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(finding patent rights exhausted under “first sale” doctrine even though item was
distributed for free).
122
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that non-commercial transfers of CAD files may not be actionable as
“sales” creates a barrier to lawsuits based on contributory
infringement. Because generating CAD files can be inexpensive, CAD
file creators may be willing to transfer them without charging money.
Similarly, websites will be willing to host the CAD files without
charging for them. Yet the availability of the CAD files can harm the
patentee in the form of lost sales127 and price erosion. Under current
interpretation, these harms cannot be rectified because transferring
CAD files for free would not constitute a sale or offer to sell under
§ 271(c).128
The second requirement — that the sale or offer to sell must be for a
“component” of the patented invention — adds additional complexity
to the issue. In the end, we conclude that a CAD file that will print the
finished product is not a component of the finished product. But we
explore the counterargument in the remainder of this section. At the
outset, it should be noted that attempting to pigeonhole a CAD file as
a “component” of the underlying physical device differs from the
normal contributory infringement case. In the majority of early
contributory infringement cases, the alleged “component” was a
physical piece of the larger patented whole. For example, for a
patented blender comprising a motor-driven base and a container, the
container would represent a component of the patented blender. Even
in this era of intangible inventions, contributory infringement
continues to play an important role. For example, many softwarerelated inventions are claimed as methods, and courts consider the
software functionality — such as an XML editor — to be a component
of the method of editing an XML document.129
But if a CAD file is a “component” of the patented physical device, it
certainly relates to the physical device in a manner distinct from prior
cases. Unlike the container that is physically part of the blender
invention, the CAD file is not part of the physical device. In fact, it is a
127 Of course, not every CAD file that is obtained for free would have been the
subject of a sale — many people who are willing to obtain the CAD file for free would
be unwilling to pay the market price for the CAD file.
128 See HollyAnne, 199 F.3d at 1309 n.7 (“Arguably, even numerous offers to
donate could not be considered an infringing act under section 271(a) because
Congress made offers to sell infringing acts and not offers to donate, despite the
obvious commercial uses of a donation.”).
129 See i4i Ltd. P’ship. v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 848-49 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301,
1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that various software products, including Microsoft
Outlook, contributorily infringed a patented method concerning a calendar datepicker function).
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digital representation of the entire device, not merely a part.
Additionally, once the CAD file is printed, the file continues to exist
separate and apart from the physical device, and the physical device no
longer needs the CAD file for its existence. We do not, for instance,
call the assembly line from which traditional devices are manufactured
“components” of the device. More naturally, we might call the CAD
file a precursor to the physical object or analogize it to a mold from
which the object is formed.
Yet analogies to traditional manufacturing techniques, in which the
manufacturer was a big company with deep pockets, are not entirely
helpful in a digital manufacturing era. The doctrine of contributory
infringement arose to protect patentees from the harm done to them
when another party commercializes the patentee’s technology.130 In
the past, we think the law did not consider a mold or an assembly line
to be a “component” of the patented device because doing so was
unnecessary to protect the patentee’s interest. The company using the
mold was likely a large, centralized business committing massive
infringement with assets to pay a large infringement judgment.131 In
contrast, the entities using the CAD files are likely to be decentralized,
individualized actors who might be guilty of a single act of
infringement when they print the item. Suing each of them is not
practical or cost effective.132 Hence, whereas a plain meaning of
“component” does not encompass a CAD file, a purposive
interpretation of the term very well might.
Courts addressing CAD files would not be writing on an entirely
clean slate, however. In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,133 the Supreme
Court analyzed the term “component” in § 271(f) of the Patent Act,134
which is written to parallel active inducement and contributory
infringement.135 Thus, the interpretation afforded to “component” in
130 See Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (finding
contributory infringement where the defendant made and sold the burner of a
patented burner/chimney combination “for the express purpose of assisting, and
making profit by assisting, in a gross infringement of the complainants’ patent”).
131 See Rantanen, supra note 84, at 1580.
132 See Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 80 (noting that without contributory infringement,
“the complainants would be driven to the task of searching out the individual
purchasers for use who actually place the chimney on the burner and use it — a
consequence which, considering the small value of each separate lamp, and the
trouble and expense of prosecution, would make the complainants helpless and
remediless”).
133 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
134 See id. (discussing whether software qualifies as a “component” under § 271(f)).
135 Michael Silhasek, Comment, Closing One Loophole and Opening Another: Why
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the context of § 271(f) should also inform that term’s meaning in §
271(c). Section 271(f)(1) and (2) track the language of § 271(b) and
(c).136 Infringement under § 271(f)(1) arises when a party “actively
induce[s] the combination” of the invention’s components outside of
the United States “in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
combination occurred within the United States.”137 A party infringes
under § 271(f)(2) when:
[She] supplies or causes to be supplied . . . any component of a
patented invention that is especially made or especially
adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use . . . knowing that such component is so made or adapted
and intending that such component will be combined outside
of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent
if such combination occurred within the United States.138
An obvious difference between § 271(b) and (c), on the one hand, and
§271(f), on the other, is that §271(f) is an extraterritorial provision that
concerns the exportation of either the unassembled components of a
claimed invention or components that have no substantial non-infringing
uses.139 Nevertheless, the language of § 271(f) should be interpreted
consistently with § 271(c), given that the same language is used.
In Microsoft, the arguable “component” was software that was sent
overseas to be loaded onto computers there.140 AT&T’s patent covered
a computer/software combination for digitally encoding and
compressing recorded speech.141 Because the patent claim required the
§ 271(f) Patent Infringement Should Apply to Method Patents After Cardiac Pacemakers,
48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 700 (2011) (“[T]he application of § 271(f) should parallel
the application of the inducement and contributory infringement statutes.”); see
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2118 (2014) (using
§ 271(f)(1) to inform analysis of § 271(b)); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med.,
Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc in relevant part) (interpreting
§ 271(f)(2) in light of § 271(c)). But see Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d
1338, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (comparing § 271(b) and § 271(f)(1), but noting
“because § 271(f)(1) lacks such a strict liability companion statute, comparisons to
§ 271(b) are of limited value”).
136 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1334 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Dyk,
J., dissenting) (“The language of section 271(f) itself mimics the language of the
indirect infringement provisions of sections 271(b) and (c).”).
137 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2012).
138 Id. § 271(f)(2).
139 See id. § 271(f)(1)–(2).
140 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007).
141 Id. at 441-42.
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combination of computer and software, neither a computer standing
alone nor the software standing alone (e.g., on a compact disk or other
pure storage medium) directly infringed the claims. Instead, direct
infringement only occurred when the software was loaded onto the
computer.142 Microsoft transported its enabling software out of the
United States to a foreign country where it was then copied, and the
copy was then combined with a computer.143
The Court’s analysis first focused on § 271(f)’s language concerning
“components” that are “combined” as supporting a tangible meaning
for the term “component.”144 Thus, software “in the abstract” is not a
component under § 271(f), but software encoded on a medium can
be.145 The Microsoft Court’s important distinction between software
“in the abstract” — which cannot be a component — and software
encoded “on a medium”146 — which can be a component — shows
that a CAD file stored on a tangible medium can sometimes be a
component.147
Yet, some commentators have suggested that the decision holds that
software stored in a medium is not a “component” under § 271(f).148
This view misapprehends the reasoning in Microsoft. The Court was
clear that only software in the abstract could not be a component, but
software in a medium could be.149 Thus, a CAD file (i.e., software) on
a medium (i.e., memory) could be a component.
In a well-written article considering the Microsoft decision’s
importance for CAD files under § 271(c), Daniel Brean avoids this
142

Id. at 446.
Id. at 442.
144 Id. at 449.
145 Id. at 449-51.
146 A “medium” includes CDs and any other form of storage, including a server or
the memory on a computer. See id. at 448-49.
147 The Court ultimately found there was no infringement because the components
had not been combined to form the patented invention, as is required under § 271(f).
On this point the majority employed a very literal interpretation of the statute and
decided that the component actually combined to make the infringing device was not
the master file sent from the United States, but rather the copy of the master file. See id.
at 453-54. Because the copy used for combination was not “supplied from the United
States” as required by § 271(f), but instead was created in a foreign country, Microsoft
was not liable for the copies. Id.
148 See, e.g., Robert A. McFarlane & Timothy V. Fisher, Software Patents Under 35
U.S.C. § 271(f): Should Congress Amend § 271 to Harmonize Protection Between Tangible
and Intangible Inventions?, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 183, 184 (2010) (“Specifically,
the Supreme Court held in Microsoft v. AT&T that a software ‘master disk’ is not a
‘component’ for purposes of § 271(f).”).
149 See Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 449-52.
143
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mistake, but unfortunately appears to commit a related non sequitur.150
Mr. Brean correctly notes the Court’s distinction between software in
the abstract and software encoded on a medium, but then suggests that
since “abstract instructions” are not components, “CAD files should not
be considered ‘components’ of subsequently printed objects.”151 To the
extent that Mr. Brean suggests CAD files cannot be components at all,
Microsoft clearly suggests the opposite — that CAD files can be
“components” as long as they are encoded on a medium.152 Because the
CAD files of interest in an infringement action would be encoded on a
medium, they could qualify as “components” under § 271.
On the other hand, for reasons other than those that commentators
have noted, the thrust of the Microsoft decision hints that it might be
difficult to capture CAD file distributors under § 271(c). Specifically,
the Court drew a firm distinction between the parts of the invention
actually covered by the claims and the things used to make those
parts.153 Thus, while the copy of the software was required by the
claims, the master disk was merely used to make the copy.154 By
analogy, the Court might distinguish between the physical device
required by a patent claim and the CAD file used to make it.
Yet the Microsoft opinion does not contain any language addressing
whether a software file that embodies the entire invention might
constitute a component under § 271.155 Rather, Microsoft states that a
software file that makes a component of an invention is not itself a
component of the invention. This point is made clearer by considering
the Court’s dicta in which it used a non-software example:
A machine for making sprockets might be used by a
manufacturer to produce tens of thousands of sprockets an
hour. That does not make the machine a “component” of the
tens of thousands of devices in which the sprockets are
incorporated, at least not under any ordinary understanding of
the term “component.” Congress, of course, might have
150

See Brean, Asserting Patents, supra note 18, at 798.
Id. at 800. The basis for Mr. Brean’s conclusion is not entirely clear. To the
extent that he means that CAD files in the abstract (not stored in computer memory)
are not components, the Microsoft opinion supports him.
152 See Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 449-51.
153 Id. at 453 (“Under this formulation, the very components supplied from the
United States, and not copies thereof, trigger § 271(f) liability when combined abroad
to form the patented invention at issue.”).
154 Id. at 453-54.
155 See generally id. (discussing whether software can be considered a component
when its combination with a computer creates an infringement).
151
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included within § 271(f)’s compass, for example, not only
combinable “components” of a patented invention, but also
“information, instructions, or tools from which those
components readily may be generated.”156
This dictum is not on all fours with a patented device made from a
CAD file. The Court is suggesting that a machine would not be a
component if it makes components (i.e., sprockets) of a patented
invention.157 But in the CAD file scenario, the “machine” in the
analogy would be the 3D printer, and the thing made by the 3D
printer is not a component of the patented item, but rather is the
entire patented item. Thus, Microsoft does not directly tell us how to
treat CAD files even under § 271(f), though its direction does not
provide encouragement to those seeking to construe CAD files as
components under § 271(c).
The Microsoft decision focused on § 271(f), and the Court took a
narrow approach to interpreting that provision in light of the
presumption against the extraterritorial extension of U.S. patent
law.158 As a result, courts may be willing to take a fresh, broader look
at the issue of whether CAD files are components of printed items
under § 271(c).159 If a court were willing to differentiate between
§ 271(f) and (c) for CAD files, it would require a very narrow parsing
of each section’s language. For a CAD file distributor to be liable
under § 271(c), a court would have to interpret the CAD file to be a
“component of the patented machine.”160 But the court would also
have to say that CAD files are not “components” that “will be

156

Id. at 451.
See id. at 450-51 (analogizing software in the abstract to a physical blueprint
and stating, “[a] blueprint may contain precise instructions for the construction and
combination of the components of a patented device, but it is not itself a combinable
component of that device”).
158 See id. at 442. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S.
Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2123-28 (2008) [hereinafter
Extraterritoriality] (discussing the principle against extraterritorial application of U.S.
law in the context of patent law).
159 An additional element of the case’s context suggests a narrow reading. Microsoft
can be read as a decision to treat U.S. software companies on the same footing as
traditional industry because in traditional industry a company that designs a product
in the United States can export that design (i.e., information) to manufacture
components abroad without facing § 271(f) liability. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 40-41, Microsoft, 550 U.S. 437 (No. 05-1056),
2006 WL 3693464.
160 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the
United States . . . a component of a patented machine . . . .”).
157
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combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe
the patent.”161 To hold both interpretations at the same time would
mean that a CAD file that prints an entire patented device is a
“component” of the device, but that a CAD file that merely prints a
component of a patented invention is not a “component” of the final
combination.162 While such an interpretation is not a logical
impossibility, it is not the most intuitive reading of the statute.
Nevertheless, there might be good policy reasons to interpret § 271(c)
in this manner, such as to allow the patentee to sue the party that
represents the root cause of the infringement.163
The foregoing discussion shows that patentees seeking to control
CAD files will find weak allies in § 271(b) and § 271(c). Indirect
infringement theories may allow patentees to capture the most brazen
infringers, but not much more. Moreover, a patent holder relying on a
strategy of suing end users who physically print the object will
encounter several problems, including: (1) detection (people printing
in their homes are hard to catch); (2) diffusion (even if the patentee
ce, the Federal Circuit and even the Supreme Court increasingly
suing one’s customers.164 Thus, traditional and obvious avenues for
legal protection will usually leave patent holders floundering. The
next Part explores an avenue through which patent holders can gain
protection against DMT infringement threats.
III. DIRECT DIGITAL INFRINGEMENT
Claims of direct infringement against those who actually “print” the
device and indirect infringement against CAD file distributors would
provide only minimal protection for patentees. They would be much
better protected if they had a claim for direct infringement based on
the CAD file itself. The majority of commentators who have analyzed
whether digital files can directly infringe patent claims directed to
physical objects simply dismiss this potential based on the view that
the law requires a physical embodiment of the invention.165 In this
161

See id. § 271(f)(2).
In essence, it would require saying that a component (the CAD file) of a
component (the physical piece) is not a component of the final combination.
163 Cf. Thornewell, supra note 120, at 2833-43 (analyzing the potential judicial
treatment of CAD files as “components” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)). Many of Mr.
Thornewell’s arguments apply with equal force to § 271(c).
164 See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Brean, Asserting Patents,
supra note 18, at 789-90 (“It would be better from the patentee’s perspective to
proceed on a theory of infringement that finds the seller of the CAD files liable, but
162
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Part, we challenge this view and demonstrate why CAD files
themselves could directly infringe patent claims in the absence of a
physical embodiment.
Direct infringement in its classic form166 arises when someone
makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or imports the patented invention
without authorization from the patent owner.167 Historically,
infringement generally was tied to physical instantiations of
inventions.168 Infringement of methods or processes typically involved
some device that would perform the process.169 Over time, Congress
has eroded this tangibility requirement in other versions of
infringement under § 271.170 But such a shift is occurring under §
271(a) as well.
In a previous article, one of us offered a bifurcated approach to the
acts of infringement under § 271(a).171 Infringement by making, using,
or importing the invention necessarily contemplates a tangible version
of the invention because what is being appropriated is the physical
item itself.172 In contrast, for infringing sales and offers to sell the
invention, it is the economic value of the invention being
appropriated, not the physical item.173 As such, there should be no
requirement for a physical instantiation of the invention with sales of,
and offers to sell, the claimed invention.174
The advent of 3D printing and other technologies that utilize CAD
files provides the occasion to reconsider this bias towards tangibility
for patent infringement not only for sales and offers to sell the claimed
the distributors of the CAD files do not ‘make’ the product.”); Depoorter, supra note
14, at 1487 (assuming direct patent infringement would only arise once CAD file is
used to print the object).
166 There are newer forms of direct infringement that have been added to the
Patent Act. See generally Holbrook, Consequences of Akamai, supra note 53, at 502 n.20
(delineating the newer forms of direct infringement). For purposes of this article, we
will focus on 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
167 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
168 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 755.
169 See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1193 (Ct. Cl. 1980)
(discussing patent infringement claim concerning satellite control system); Acme Steel
Co. v. E. Venetian Blind Co., 130 F. Supp. 459 (D. Md. 1955) (holding one-stage
machine method did not infringe on plaintiff’s patent).
170 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 815-20 (discussing how
infringement under ANDA litigation and § 271(f) no longer require tangible items for
infringement).
171 Id. at 805-15.
172 Id. at 813-15.
173 Id. at 805-13.
174 Id. at 805.
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invention but also for making, using, and importing it. When a
physical instantiation of the device is a mere button press away, does it
really make sense to view only the tangible embodiment of the
invention as infringing? In the software context, the tangibleintangible divide has already been erased, with software now able to
perform functions that hardware would have done in the past.175 Do
we think the patent system should also erase that divide? We are the
first to explore this potential.
There are no perfect tangible-era analogies to CAD files as
manufacturing tools, but two commonly suggested comparisons are to
blueprints and molds.176 Under patent law doctrine in the tangible era,
“making” or “using” a mold or blueprints for a patented device would
not constitute direct infringement.177 In the age of digital
manufacturing, however, lawmakers will need to study closely
whether CAD files should be treated as identical to the tangible item.
While the idea may sound foreign to our tangible-tuned ears, it may
sound perfectly natural to digital manufacturing natives one day.178
For example, in the digital era of movies and books, lay people do not
distinguish between having a digital copy of a song or book: if you
have the file, you have the book. 179 Once 3D printing is ubiquitous
and inexpensive, perhaps laypeople will feel the same way about CAD
files — having the file is the same as having the object. This section

175

See supra note 2.
See Thornewell, supra note 120, at 2833-42.
177 See United States v. C.M. Lane Lifeboat Co., 118 F.2d 793, 795-96 (2d. Cir.
1941) (discussing blueprints for lifeboats, and noting the produced boats “finally
proved to infringe claims of the patent”); Niks v. Marinette Paper Co., 11 F.R.D. 384,
385 (N.D.N.Y. 1951) (requiring defendant to produce blueprints of device alleged to
infringe on plaintiff’s patent, but not ordering physical inspection of actual device);
Luten v. Camp, 221 F. 424, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1915) (discussing a dispute over discovery
of blueprints, not to prove infringement via blueprints alone, but instead as relevant to
show infringement pertaining to a reinforced concrete bridge that had been
constructed).
178 Recall that it may be possible for patentees to draft claims covering digital
versions of their inventions. See supra note 19. If such claims constitute patentable
subject matter, they would be the easiest route to protect CAD files in the digital age.
Such claims would not, however, protect patentees whose patents have already issued.
180 See Katie Arnold-Ratliff, Soft Target: Have Reports of the Paperback’s Death Been
Greatly Exaggerated?, SLATE (June 20, 2013, 7:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
technology/technology/2013/06/declining_sales_of_paperbacks_are_e_readers_killing
_the_softcover.html (discussing potential disruption of resale and paperback books in
light of ebooks, showing that the two are fungible (though with different collateral
market effects)).
176
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explores the potential for direct infringement based on the CAD files
themselves.
A. Selling or Offering to Sell the Claimed Invention via a CAD File
The simplicity of converting a CAD file to the actual object should
lead us to ask whether someone selling or offering to sell the CAD file
has effectively sold the item itself. Given that the line between the
intangible CAD file and the tangible item now is so thin, one could
easily argue that the sale of the file should be effectively an infringing
sale of the item itself. The interest in the purchaser is not the CAD file
itself, but instead in the item to be produced by the CAD file. We
think such sales and offers to sell are attempts to appropriate the
economic value of the item, harming the patent owner pecuniarily.
Historically, however, the law has required tangible embodiments of
the invention, even for infringing sales.180 This is unsurprising for two
reasons. First, during the industrial age, most technology was
incorporated into some sort of physical form.181 Second, the courts
were somewhat hostile to patents because of the seemingly
anticompetitive nature of their exclusive rights.182 The Supreme Court
in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. interpreted § 271(a)
narrowly in part by considering “this Nation’s historical antipathy to
monopoly and of repeated congressional efforts to preserve and foster
competition.”183

180 See, e.g., Ecodyne Corp. v. Croll-Reynolds Eng’g Co., 491 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D.
Conn. 1979) (“When the thing in question is an apparatus and the issue is patent
infringement by sale, partial delivery will not suffice; in order for there to have been a
sale within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), the entire apparatus must have been
constructed and ready for use.”). See generally Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note
9, at 801-03 (discussing state of the law requiring a physical embodiment of the
invention for infringement).
181 See Miriam Bitton, Patenting Abstractions, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 153, 157-58 (2014).
182 See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 223 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting) (“For decades this Court has denied relief from contributory
infringement to patent holders who attempt to extend their patent monopolies to
unpatented materials used in connection with patented inventions.”); Ductmate
Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., No. 84 C 5152, 1985 WL 2179, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
12, 1985) (“Requiring a direct infringement in the United States balances the
patentee’s right to the exclusive control over his patent against the historical antipathy
to monopoly in order to assure that the patentee not over-extend the reach of his
limited patent monopoly.”).
183 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972).
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Although the Supreme Court might continue to harbor such
concerns about the anticompetitive aspects of patents,184 Congress
clearly does not share that viewpoint any longer.185 Congress has
expanded the scope of infringement numerous times over the last forty
years.186 In general, Congress views patents favorably.187
Unlike the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit has been more
willing to reconsider whether something tangible must exist for there
to be infringement by selling or offering to sell the invention.188 As one
of us previously articulated, infringing sales and offers to sell an
invention are “an appropriation of the economic value of the
invention, as opposed to its physical incarnation” such that a physical
embodiment should not be required.189

184 See Tim Holbrook, Is the Supreme Court About to Rule that Software is Ineligible
for Patent Protection?, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
realspin/2014/03/16/is-the-supreme-court-about-to-rule-that-software-is-ineligible-forpatent-protection; see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s
Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 63-65 (2013).
185 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 764 (“The history of § 271
demonstrates that, contrary to the Supreme Court’s historical antipathy to patents,
Congress has taken an expansive view of them, enlarging the class of activities covered
by the patent statute’s forms of infringement.”).
186 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering
in the United States to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 UC DAVIS L. REV. 701, 719-23 (2004)
[hereinafter Territoriality Waning] (discussing amendments to § 271); see also
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the
United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 18-19 (2004)
(discussing constitutionality of expansion of forms of infringement for existing
patents).
187 One exception to Congress’s favorable views of the patent system has been
recent patent reform efforts to address patent assertion entities (“PAEs”), also known
as trolls. See generally Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010)
(coining the term “patent assertion entities”). Some commentators have criticized
aspects of these reform efforts. See, e.g., Timothy Holbrook, Not All Patent Trolls Are
Demons, CNN (Feb. 21, 2014, 9:08 AM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/21/opinion/
holbrook-patent-trolls-demons (explaining the benefits that patent assertion entities
provide to holders of valid patents).
188 See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA,
Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1310 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[The district court] never reached
the factual issue of whether the subject of the offer to sell was of a ‘patented invention’
by analyzing the design of the rig. Of course, in this analysis, the district court must
determine what was offered for sale, not what was ultimately delivered.”).
189 Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility After Transocean, 61 EMORY
L.J. 1087, 1106 (2012) [hereinafter After Transocean].
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The Federal Circuit expressly adopted this approach in Transocean
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.190 In
that case, Maersk had offered to sell an oil rig and that offer had been
accepted.191 The rig ultimately delivered, however, differed from the
one contemplated in the offer and sale and, in fact, did not infringe.192
The Federal Circuit nevertheless concluded that there could be
infringement based on the diagrams and descriptions contained in the
offer to sell.193 The court emphasized that the “underlying purpose of
holding someone who offers to sell liable for infringement is to
prevent ‘generating interest in a potential infringing product to the
commercial detriment of the rightful patentee.’”194 Because an offer to
sell or sale of an item that has yet to be constructed can harm the
patentee, the court allowed a claim for infringement based solely on a
paper contract and rejected the defendant’s argument that “the entire
apparatus must have been constructed and ready for use in order to
have been sold.”195
The Transocean decision is the first to find infringement under
§ 271(a) based on documents alone without a physical embodiment of
the invention.196 We have written in support of the court’s focus on
the economic interests of the patentee,197 as have other
commentators.198 By focusing on the harm done to the patentee by the
sale or offer to sale, the court opened the door to finding infringement
based on the sale or offer to sell of a CAD file. An offer to sell or sale of
190

617 F.3d 1296.
Id. at 1307.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1310 n.4.
194 Id. at 1309 (quoting 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
195 Id. at 1311.
196 See Holbrook, After Transocean, supra note 189, at 1106. Abbreviated New
Drug Application (“ANDA”) litigation also is based primarily on paper — the ANDA
— as opposed to what is actually sold on the market. See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale,
supra note 9, at 815-17.
197 See Holbrook, After Transocean, supra note 189, at 1106; see also Holbrook,
Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 788-98; Osborn, Offer to Sell, supra note 123, at 17276, 199-200.
198 See Melissa Y. Lerner, You Can Run, but You Can’t Hide: The Expansion of Direct
Infringement and the Evisceration of Preventive Contracting in Maersk, 93 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 207, 232 (2011); Scott A. Cromar, Note, The Location of the
Contemplated Sale as the Ultimate Guide in “Offer to Sell” Transnational U.S. Patent
Infringement Cases, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1755, 1783; Rex W. Miller, Note, Construing
“Offers to Sell” Patent Infringement: Why Economic Interests Rather Than Territoriality
Should Guide the Construction, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 441-50 (2009).
191
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a CAD file of the patented invention would directly impact the
patentee’s commercial interests. The sale of the CAD file could
displace the sale of the actual item. The patent owner may also have to
lower its price — price erosion — in order to compete with the CAD
files, even if no one ever purchases them.199
Such a step is not terribly surprising. The Supreme Court has
recognized in the patent validity context that an invention can be
commercially appropriated absent a tangible embodiment.200 Under
the 1952 Patent Act’s on-sale bar, a patent applicant is barred from
obtaining a patent if she offered to sell the invention more than one
year prior to filing the application.201 The Supreme Court in Pfaff v.
Wells Electronics made it clear that, to be on-sale, the invention need
not be physically built: diagrams and other descriptions that would
enable a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to build the
device are sufficient.202 Thus, in the on-sale bar context, the Supreme
Court has recognized that “the value of an invention can be
appropriated even absent a physical incarnation of the invention.”203
Transocean is, in essence, a modest extension of this reality.
One commentator, however, has rejected application of Transocean
to CAD files.204 Mr. Brean argues, as a doctrinal matter, that
Transocean is inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s earlier decision in
Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co.205 Mr. Brean highlights the
199

See supra note 125 (discussing price erosion).
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998).
201 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). The America Invents Act (“AIA”) also precludes a
patent if the invention was on sale, but provides a one-year grace period only if the
on-sale activity was by the inventor or by someone who took the invention from the
inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b). For a discussion of how the AIA prior art
provisions operate, see MOORE, HOLBROOK & MURPHY, supra note 71, at 691-98. While
it is highly likely that the interpretations of the 1952 on-sale bar will define the AIA
provisions, there is some dispute as to whether “secret” sales will trigger the bar under
the AIA as they do under the 1952 Patent Act. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Does
‘Public Use’ Mean the Same Thing It Did Last Year?, 93 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2394153 (discussing
uncertainty surrounding interpretation of amended statute).
202 Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 68. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things
Change, the More They Stay the Same: Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and
the Quest for Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933 (2000)
(suggesting how courts should approach on-sale bar questions after the Pfaff
decision).
203 See Holbrook, After Transocean, supra note 189, at 1108.
204 Brean, Asserting Patents, supra note 18, at 792.
205 Id. at 791-93. Brean also relies on the district court decision in Ecodyne Corp. v.
Croll-Reynolds Engineering Co., 491 F. Supp. 194 (D. Conn. 1979), to support the
argument that there must be a physical embodiment in order for there to be a sale of
200

1360

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 48:1319

Transocean court’s language that reads: “[A] ‘sale’ is not limited to the
transfer of tangible property; a sale may also be the agreement by
which such a transfer takes place. In this case, there was a contract to
sell a rig that included schematics.”206 Mr. Brean interprets this
language to mean that “Transocean still requires an agreement to
transfer a tangible object” and thus would not cover the sale of CAD
files.207
Before addressing Mr. Brean’s doctrinal position, we emphasize that
ours is not merely a doctrinal inquiry. We are not simply asking
whether the law at present will allow such liability. We are asking
whether the law should do so. Our contention is that it should, as a
normative matter, regardless of whether current case law permits it.
But, even doctrinally, we do not share the view that Transocean was
wrongly decided and that it should not apply in this context.
the invention. Id. at 790-91. Ecodyne does expressly hold as such, but the decision is
obviously not binding on the Federal Circuit. Indeed, it pre-dates both the creation of
the Federal Circuit and the amendment of § 271(a) to include offering to sell the
invention as a form of infringement. See Technical Mfg. Corp. v. Integrated Dynamics
Eng’g, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 339, 342-43 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Compounding the
conceptual difficulty is the fact that both Joy Technologies and Ecodyne arose during an
earlier period when United States patent law did not include liability for offers to sell
infringing products.”).
Moreover, the court’s argument in Ecodyne would render the “sell” form of
infringement superfluous: if the invention must be made in order for there to be a
sale, then there would be no need for infringement via a sale. The issue would resolve
into the issue of the appropriate damages award. See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra
note 9, at 759-60 (“The Court, by phrasing the question of whether the infringer
‘did . . . make (and then sell)’ suggests that the making of the invention is a necessary
prerequisite to selling the invention. This reading of the statute seemingly vitiates the
‘sale’ form of infringement because, for there to be a sale, the person selling the device
would have infringed already under the ‘make’ provision. This reading violates the
canon of statutory construction that ‘courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes
that render language superfluous.’” (citations omitted)); see also Holbrook, After
Transocean, supra note 189, at 1107-08 (“The Court [in Deepsouth] thus seems to
suggest that infringing sales are tied to the manufacture of the good, not merely to the
sale. Transocean is arguably inconsistent with this view. In Deepsouth, all of the
components were manufactured, just not assembled. . . . The stronger argument is
that the Supreme Court did not truly confront purely intangible infringement through
sales. Instead, it was focused on the actual manufacture of the components that were
then sent overseas. The Court did not address what would have happened if the device
ultimately assembled had been sold in the United States pursuant to a contract before
any of the parts were assembled. The tangibility issue simply was not before the
Court.”).
206 Brean, Asserting Patents, supra note 18, at 792 (quoting Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1311 (Fed.
Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
207 Id. at 793.
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Mr. Brean reads far more into Lang that it deserves.208 In Lang, the
patent owner filed an infringement suit based on the production of a
patented boat hull, but the hull was not yet fully constructed.209 The
accused infringer was not the manufacturer of the hull but instead the
intended purchaser.210 The Federal Circuit affirmed a dismissal of a
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the complaint
contained two counts that related to patent infringement.211 The first
count was for a declaratory judgment for the threat of future
infringement, and the Federal Circuit held there was no actual
controversy because “the accused infringers had not distributed sales
literature, prepared to solicit orders, or engaged in any activity
indicating that the ship would soon be ready for sea.”212 As for the
second count, a request for a preliminary injunction, the entirety of
the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is as follows:
That statute, by itself, cannot be interpreted to cover acts other
than an actual making, using or selling of the patented
invention. Because Pacific Marine’s allegedly infringing ship’s
hull was still nine months from completion when the
complaint was filed, the district court correctly dismissed
Count II for failure to state a claim under section 271.213
There is virtually no discussion of whether a sale could constitute
infringement absent a tangible item. Given the thin, conclusory
reasoning and that the accused infringer was not the seller, Brean
reads too much into the opinion by suggesting that Lang requires a
tangible item for there to be an infringing sale.
Moreover, and most importantly, Lang predates the adoption of the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(“TRIPS”), as a result of which Congress amended § 271(a) to add
208

See id. at 791.
Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“At the
time suit was filed, Thompson Metal was in the process of manufacturing a hull
structure for Pacific Marine & Supply that Lang contends would, when finished,
infringe its patent.”).
210 Id.; see also Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 703 F. Supp. 1404, 1406 (D.
Haw. 1989) (“Pursuant to a contract with Pacific Marine, Thompson Metal is in the
process of manufacturing the hull structure for a swath type vessel which Plaintiffs
contend will infringe on one or more of their patents.”).
211 The complaint contained five counts total. Lang, 895 F.3d at 763. Lang
appealed the two counts relating to patent infringement, one alleging false patent
marking, and the other alleging false advertising. Id.
212 Id. at 763-65.
213 Id. at 765 (citations omitted).
209
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“offering to sell” and “importing” as forms of direct infringement.214
As such, the decision has no precedential effect on the interpretation
of the “offer to sell” provision, as was performed in Transocean.215
Moreover, the adoption of “offers to sell” as a form of direct
infringement may require a reconsideration of the “sale” form if
inconsistencies arise between the two.216
Transocean of course does not definitively answer the question of
CAD files because the court was not considering digital infringement.
Yet the thrust of the opinion may be broader than Mr. Brean suggests
for at least three reasons. First, although the offer to sell did
contemplate the eventual transfer of a tangible device, the defendant
would have been liable even if no transfer ever took place.217 Thus
tangibility was not a requirement for infringement under the court’s
analysis.
Second, rather than focusing on the tangibility of the device, the
court focused on the economic interests of the patentee.218 The
patentee’s interests would often be more directly implicated by the sale
of CAD files than a contract for the future sale of a tangible item. CAD
files are easily transferable and are one click away from producing a
tangible object. A transfer of a CAD file is likely to take place
immediately and makes future, tangible infringement all too easy.
Contracts for future delivery as in Transocean may never lead to
tangible infringement because the contracted item may never be built,
let alone delivered.
Third, as this Article has discussed, 3D printing and other DMT are
bridging the digital and physical worlds, rendering many of the
distinctions between “tangible” and “intangible” anachronistic.
Whether the device was “tangible” at the time it was transferred is
inconsequential from the view of the patentee’s interests. Because the
214 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a)(3)(B), 108
Stat. 4809, 4988 (1994); see also Holbrook, Territoriality Waning, supra note 186, at 722.
215 See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA,
Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1308-10 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
216 See Technical Mfg. Corp. v. Integrated Dynamics Eng’g, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d
339, 342-44 (D. Mass. 2002).
217 Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1310-11. Infringement would hold even if the device
was never constructed or was constructed in a modified way to avoid infringement.
Indeed, the defendant in Transocean attempted to avoid infringement by constructing
the device in a way that differed from the specifications contained in the offer to sell.
The court refused to allow subsequent design modification to avoid infringement,
stating, “[t]he potentially infringing article is the rig sold in the contract, not the
altered rig that Maersk USA delivered to the U.S.” Id. at 1311.
218 Id. at 1309.

2015]

Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing

1363

CAD file can be printed with ease in the privacy of a home or business,
the patentee does not care whether it was printed before the transfer
or after. In fact, the transfer of the CAD file is potentially more harmful
to the patentee, because that CAD file can be copied and further
distributed to many more users.
Opponents of our view could argue that CAD files are different from
the Transocean scenario. In Transocean, the offer and completed sale
contemplated the delivery of a single item, the oil rig.219 The lost sale
is tied to the singular item contemplated by the commercial activity. In
contrast, a sale or offer to sell a CAD file is not limited to one
instantiation of the invention. The CAD file can be used to create
multiple copies of the patented invention. There is no correlation
between the sale and the item. The CAD file, in some sense, just the
potential for infringement, and there is no infringement until an item
has been produced. Thus, infringement should be limited in the
context of CAD files solely to the “making” of the invention, once the
CAD file is used to direct the printer.
We do not view this as a distinction of importance. Part of that
argument begs the question of what the “item” should be — the file or
the ultimately produced item. Moreover, it would seem that the sale of
the file actually risks far greater harm to the patent owner than the sale
of a single embodiment (tangible or intangible) of the patented
invention. Ultimately, we view this concern as one more of remedy —
injunctions and the appropriate damages award — as opposed to one
of liability. In other words, a CAD file versus a contract may impact
how we measure the harm to the patentee and, as a result, the
appropriate damages. It should not determine the threshold question
of whether there is liability.
Hence, the Federal Circuit and even the Supreme Court increasingly
recognize that tangibility is not the sine qua non of offers to sell and
sales of patented inventions.220 It is possible that the Federal Circuit
could already regard the offer to sell and sale of CAD files as an act of
patent infringement.221 Nevertheless, patentees may remain vulnerable
219

Id. at 1307.
See Holbrook, After Transocean, supra note 189, at 1108 (discussing Pfaff v.
Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998)).
221 Treating offers and sales of CAD files as acts of infringement would produce
many interesting consequences. Although space constraints prevent us from exploring
them in this Article, we query for future research whether mere advertisements of
CAD files might constitute contract-law “offers” because there is no “multiple
acceptance” problem that renders most advertisements mere invitations for offers. See
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 134 (4th ed. 2004) (“A customer would not usually
have reason to believe that the shopkeeper intended exposure to the risk of a
220
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to harm from CAD files because, as discussed previously, CAD files
can be made so cheaply that others might be willing not to sell them,
but to offer them to the world for free.222
B. Should a CAD File Constitute “Making” the Patented Invention
A large gap in protection to the patentee, however, is that liability
for selling or offering to sell the invention requires a sale; offers to
donate and actual donations are not infringing.223 If freely transferred
CAD files are not sales or offers to sell, a patentee could only capture
the creators and purveyors of such files through a change or extension
of current law. Some of the CAD webpages that have popped up
simply post these files and allow free downloads, and peer-to-peer
networks already facilitate free transfers of CAD files.224 These
activities fall outside of the commercial appropriation protection
afforded by the “sales” and “offers to sell” forms of infringement.
Patentees may want to rely on the statutory category of infringement
by “making” the patented invention.225 Each act of copying a CAD file
would constitute an independent act of “making” the invention. Given
the simplicity of translating a file into a physical embodiment, we
consider whether the tangible-intangible divide still makes sense. In
earlier work, one of us argued that “making” the patented invention
required a physical embodiment because the infringement involved
multitude of acceptances resulting in a number of contracts exceeding the
shopkeeper’s inventory.”). Additionally, numerous extraterritoriality issues will arise
when offers cross national borders. See Lucas S. Osborn, Ripple Effects in the Law: The
Broadening Meaning of an “Offer to Sell” in Patent Law, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 549,
559-72 (2014) [hereinafter Ripple Effects] (describing extraterritorial consequences of
inter-country offers).
222 See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
223 See HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding, in the personal jurisdiction context, that “a mere offer to donate, where a
donation is never made, cannot be an offer for sale” under § 271(a)). The court
limited its holding to the facts of the case, which were that the offered donation was
small and insignificant, the donation was never consummated, and the would-be
donor appeared not to be motivated by any current or future commercial gain. Id.
224 Ernesto, supra note 66. For a webpage facilitating finding free CAD file
downloads, see Where to Find Free 3D CAD Models for 3D Printing, 3D PRINTING SYS.,
http://3dprintingsystems.com/where-to-find-free-3d-cad-models-for-3d-printing (last
visited Feb. 10, 2015).
225 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (listing the unauthorized “making” of the
patented invention as acts of infringement). A patentee could also attempt to sue a
CAD file owner for “using” the invention, but current law interprets “using” the
invention in such a way as to make this claim unlikely to succeed. See Brean, Asserting
Patents, supra note 18, at 800-03.
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the physical appropriation of the invention.226 Commercial
appropriations through sales and offers to sell the invention, however,
would not require a physical embodiment.227 CAD files and 3D
printing, however, require us to reconsider this bifurcation.
In thinking about the ways that an invention can be “made,” one
can consider a spectrum of activities that begin to approximate the
making of the invention, represented in the below diagram.

Blueprint

Molds

Unassembled
Parts

Completed
Item

At the far right is the classic case of making the invention — a
completed tangible item. There is no controversy that completion of
the patented invention would qualify as “making” the invention under
§ 271(a). At the other extreme, there are blueprints, engineering
design diagrams, and the like. These items, whether paper or digital,
disclose the claimed invention, yet there remains a need for
considerable effort and skill to create the physical manifestation of the
invention. Historically, such diagrams would not constitute an
infringing “making” of the invention,228 and we agree. The amount of
effort, skill, and resources required to translate the blueprint into the
actual invention convinces us that mere blueprints should not
constitute infringement for making the claimed invention.
Molds are somewhat closer to finished items, at least for inventions
amenable to being formed in this fashion. Once the mold is created, an
industrial process can create the item; yet this entails expensive and
detailed machinery and processes.229 So, while this moves us down the
226 Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 805 (“The nature of the
appropriation varies according to the infringing act. In the context of offers to sell the
invention and actual sales of the invention, the appropriation is commercial. In this
context, the infringer has utilized the invention for commercial gain without
compensating the patentee. In the context of ‘making,’ ‘using,’ or ‘importing’ the
invention, however, the appropriation is physical use of the invention without
compensation. To properly analyze infringement as appropriation, the courts should
take a bifurcated approach, analyzing offers to sell and sales distinctly from the
infringement analysis for making, using, or importing the invention.”).
227 Id.
228 See supra note 177.
229 See Alec, Is 3D Printing a Viable and Affordable Alternative to Injection Molding
Production?, 3DERS (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.3ders.org/articles/20141106-is-3dprinting-technology-a-viable-and-affordable-alternative-to-injection-molding-
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spectrum to some extent, we do not believe that molds cross the line
where the mold alone should constitute an act of making the claimed
invention. We also expect that this question rarely arises because,
unlike CAD files, few, if any, molds can create a complete and
operable patented product with no further assembly required.230
Another point on the spectrum is the situation where someone has
made all of the components of the invention but has not assembled
them. These scenarios were present in Deepsouth231 and Paper
Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp.232 In Deepsouth, the
accused infringer had manufactured the components of the invention
and shipped them abroad for assembly.233 Addressing the territorial
limits of U.S. patent law, the Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision,
concluded that the accused infringer had not “made” the invention
within the United States under § 271(a) of the Patent Act.234
The Federal Circuit did not confront a territoriality issue in Paper
Converting. Instead the court had to deal with a patent’s expiration: the
accused infringer never assembled the complete machine during the
patent term.235 The infringer instead tested various parts of the device
in isolation, and the customer assembled the machine two days after
the patent expired.236 The Federal Circuit concluded that this activity
constituted infringement and distinguished Deepsouth as being limited
to the extraterritorial issue.237
The Federal Circuit’s distinction of Deepsouth is dubious, and courts
have since marginalized Paper Converting.238 Regardless, the Supreme
production.html.
230 See,
e.g., Casting: Metal Casting Process, THE LIBRARY OF MFG.,
http://www.thelibraryofmanufacturing.com/metalcasting_basics.html (last visited Dec.
31, 2014) (“A mold is formed into the geometric shape of a desired part.”).
231 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
232 Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
233 See Holbrook, Extraterritoriality, supra note 158, at 2131-32.
234 See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531. Congress legislatively overruled Deepsouth when
it adopted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) in 1984. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med.,
Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Holbrook, Extraterritoriality,
supra note 158, at 2132.
235 Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 15-16.
236 Id. at 14-15; see also J. Dwyer Murphy, Case Note, Paper Converting Machine
Company v. Magna-Graphics Corporation: Increased Protection Against Making and
Using Combination Patents, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 761, 776 (1985).
237 Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 16-20.
238 See De Graffenried v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 209, 214 (1992); Conner
Peripherals, Inc. v. W. Digital Corp., No. C-93-20117-RMW-EAI, 1993 WL 645932, at
*12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 1993) (noting that the narrow purpose of Paper Converting
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Court’s split decision in Deepsouth decision and the arguably
inconsistent holding of the Federal Circuit in Paper Converting
confirm that the creation of the components of a device that remain
unassembled falls far closer to the line of an infringing “making” of
the invention (and, in the minds of some, actually crosses that line).
Where, then, do CAD files fall? They are completely intangible,
which makes them considerably different than unassembled
components. Yet they are far different than blueprints or molds
because the creation of the object from the file is simple and routine. It
just takes the push of a button. Potentially, it is even easier than
assembling the components of an apparatus, which could take
considerable effort and skill, not to mention tools.
Our contention is that the interest in CAD files is not the files
themselves, but instead the object ultimately produced. Generally,
someone does not download a CAD file simply for the purpose of
having the file. Instead, the purpose is to produce the object for which
the file codes. As a result, some of these freely disseminated CAD files
would likely displace some of the patent holder’s sales. The
dramatically reduced gap between the physical and intangible suggests
that the mere creation of the CAD file could, and perhaps should,
constitute an infringing “making” of the patented item. Otherwise,
patentees will often be helpless against massive, gratuitous
dissemination of CAD files.239 If the courts or Congress were to take
this step, it would provide greater protection for patent holders against
infringement in the emerging era of 3D printing and similar
technologies.
C. Intangible Infringement via the Doctrine of Equivalents
The above direct infringement analysis highlights that 3D printing
and other DMT have matured after the current patent infringement
laws were drafted. Luckily, patent law, being concerned with the
forefront of technological advancement, has important doctrines to
accommodate technological change. One such doctrine, the doctrine
was to preserve the patent term).
239 Although space constraints prevent us from addressing them here, we note that if
the law considered copying a CAD file to be “making” the invention, many legal
questions would arise. Just to raise a few: Query whether internet intermediaries should
be liable for making copies on their servers? If a CAD file enters the United States
electronically, does that constitute an “importation” (and if so, who is liable for the
importation)? What of files passing temporarily through the United States on the “wires”
of the internet (when 35 U.S.C. § 272 is limited to inventions needed on temporarily
present vessels, aircraft, or vehicles)? We leave these questions to future work.
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of equivalents, ensures that the “scope of a patent is not limited to its
literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims
described.”240
The doctrine was created to prevent competitors from avoiding
infringement by making unimportant and insubstantial differences to
their technology.241 For example, one cannot escape infringement of a
patent covering a complex patented machine by simply substituting
screws for bolts when attaching the machine pieces together
(assuming the claim required bolts). The doctrine is particularly useful
to prevent the patent’s obsolescence. Patent owners are able to capture
technologies that arise after the patent’s issuance that nevertheless are
deemed close enough to the claimed invention to constitute
infringement.242
While the application of the doctrine of equivalents is highly factintensive and not a “prisoner of a formula,”243 courts have developed
various formulations for analyzing whether a particular accused device
is equivalent to the patented device.244 First, courts can use the
“insubstantial differences” test, which simply asks whether there is a
substantial difference between an element of the patented product and
the accused product.245 Second, courts can follow the “triple identity”
test and ask whether the accused element performs substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially
the same result.246 Finally, the known interchangeability of the
claimed limitation and the element in the device accused of infringing
also informs the analysis.247 Evaluation of equivalency remains a
highly fact-intensive inquiry.248
240

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002).
Id.
242 See Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent
Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 174-75 (2005); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15-29 (2009)
[hereinafter Patent Law’s Possession Paradox].
243 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
244 We are using language loosely here; as explained below, the equivalents analysis
looks not at the invention as a whole, but rather at each element or limitation in
isolation.
245 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40
(1997); Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Sage Prods., Inc.
v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
246 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39-40.
247 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609 (“An important factor is whether persons
reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an
ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was.”).
248 Id.
241
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As one of us has noted previously, it may be possible for patentees
to use the doctrine of equivalents to capture CAD files, even if the
courts do not adopt our above analysis for direct infringement for
selling, offering to sell, or making the invention.249 A court
confronting equivalency in the CAD context will have to perform the
test on an element-by-element basis.250 Initially, this might appear
conceptually difficult because CAD files do not have elements in the
same way that physical devices do. The file itself has no “components”
for a basis of comparison; they are merely code for the printer to
produce the item. This line of thinking, however, demonstrates a predigital era framework. In the digital era, courts could compare the
elements of what the CAD file would print to the limitations listed in the
patent claims.
To a pre-digital mind, CAD files are very different from the physical
device, and thus we suspect that there will be strong resistance to
applying the doctrine of equivalents in this way. Again, however, in a
post-digital manufacturing world, if a patentee cannot protect against
the distribution of CAD files, it is largely powerless to stop many
forms of infringement. Thus, if literal infringement cannot help the
patentee, a fairness rationale could suggest applying the doctrine to
CAD files.251 Applying the doctrine of equivalents in this novel way
also finds support in the doctrine’s emphasis on technology that
becomes significant after a patent was filed.252 In a world with
249 Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 587 (“[A]s 3D printing brings
closer together merges the worlds of bits and atoms, the equivalents argument does
not seem that far-fetched — the CAD file is practically the same thing as the physical
product.”).
250 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29 (“Each element contained in a patent claim is
deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine
of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the
invention as a whole.”). Patent claims contain “elements” or “limitations,” which are
simply the sub-parts of the invention. Thus, a patent claim to a chair might contain
the elements of four legs, a flat surface for seating support, and a vertical surface for
supporting the back of the user. The claim must also describe how the various
elements are put together. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 96 (4th ed. 2013).
251 See generally Holbrook, Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, supra note 242, at 3637 (arguing fairness as most persuasive normative basis for doctrine of equivalents);
Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A
New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1956-60 (2005)
(tracing a fairness rationale for the doctrine of equivalents).
252 See Meurer & Nard, supra note 251, at 1970 (“The third source of friction arises
from the difficulty foreseeing technical developments relevant to the patented
technology.”); see also Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc.,
145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The doctrine of equivalents is necessary
because one cannot predict the future. . . . [A] variant of an invention may be
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ubiquitous DMT, CAD files will in many ways be insubstantially
different from the physical device, just as a digital copy of a book is
insubstantially different from the printed version.
IV. SHOULD COURTS RECOGNIZE CLAIMS FOR DIGITAL PATENT
INFRINGEMENT?
Thus far, we have largely described potential applications of patent
laws to DMT in light of the harm that patentees might incur from
CAD files. We have demonstrated that patent law is already flexible
enough to capture some digital patent infringement and that
additional extensions of the law would capture much more. But it is
important to look holistically at the issue in light of the patent
system’s various goals and the effects of recognizing a claim for digital
patent infringement. This Part explores a number of these
countervailing considerations.
A. Impact on the Incentive to Innovate
Because the main purpose of the patent system is to incentivize
innovation,253 we must carefully consider the impact on the costs and
risks of innovation if the extensions we propose are adopted. As we
have argued, if patentees cannot control the CAD files that are central
to DMT, they will lose much of their ability to monetize their patent
rights. This loss of enforcement power could dampen innovative
incentives, possibly leading to underinvestment in innovation.
But there is a flipside to the incentive story for DMT because DMT
has the potential to significantly lower the costs of innovation, thus
reducing the need for a strong patent system. One of us has explored

developed after the patent is granted, and that variant may constitute so insubstantial
a change from what is claimed in the patent that it should be held to be an
infringement.”); Cotropia, supra note 242, at 161 (“As of late, the emphasis on the
doctrine of equivalents has focused on protecting one specific type of equivalent
termed an ‘after-arising equivalent.’”). Of course, 3D printing has existed since the
1980s, but it has only recently begun to enter the public’s general awareness. See
Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 560. Hence, neither inventors nor
patent attorneys would be likely to have considered CAD files as a meaningful method
of protection until recently. It cannot, however, be considered an “after-arising”
technology indefinitely. At some point, it becomes the patentee’s obligation to
affirmatively draft claims to CAD files, if patent law will allow it.
253 E.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (“The patent laws
promote [technological] progress by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited
period as an incentive for their inventiveness and research efforts.”).
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the issue elsewhere254 and it is worth highlighting some of the impacts
of DMT on innovation costs.255 For example, 3D printing is
dramatically lowering the costs of scientific research tools used for
basic research.256 3D printing also lowers the costs of prototyping an
invention and advancing the prototype into a commercial
embodiment.257 Once a commercial embodiment is ready for
production, 3D printing lowers the costs and risks of a product launch
because the inventor can manufacture on an as-needed basis, rather
than paying huge up-front costs for mass-production machines. Of
course, because CAD files can be transmitted directly to purchasers for
remote printing, the costs of distributing final products can be greatly
reduced as well.
These are examples to highlight that, once mature, DMT will
demand a thorough reevaluation of the patent system’s balance. If
DMT dramatically reduces the costs and risks of innovation as a
whole, then it might also correspondingly reduce the need for current
patent incentives.258 A crucial premise of the patent system is that
inventors need the period of exclusivity to recover sunk research and
development costs.259 If DMT dramatically reduces these costs, then
lawmakers may need to recalibrate the system. This is not necessarily
to say that we should abolish the patent system, but rather that we
might modify it to provide a smaller incentive. For example, we might
shorten the patent term from its current term of twenty years from the
application date.260
254 Lucas S. Osborn et al., The Case for Weaker Patents, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2585764.
255 As used here, innovation includes the stages of basic research, invention,
prototyping, developing a commercial embodiment, marketing, and distribution. Id. at
14-15.
256 Joshua M. Pearce, Building Research Equipment with Free, Open-Source
Hardware, 337 SCIENCE 1303, 1303-04 (2012); Osborn et al., supra note 254, at 15-22.
257 See, e.g., CHEE KAI CHUA ET AL., RAPID PROTOTYPING: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS
13-14 (3d ed. 2010) (describing the benefits of 3D printing); Osborn et al., supra note
254, at 22-35.
258 However, one must also take into account that DMT makes it easier for
infringers to copy successful products quickly. Osborn et al., supra note 254, at 44-46.
259 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SW. L.J. 123, 134-35
(2006) [hereinafter Possession].
260 Osborn et al., supra note 254, at 52-55. Our international obligations under the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) would limit
Congress’s ability to alter patent terms because it requires at least a twenty-year term.
See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532, 108 Stat. 4809, 4984
(1994) (adopting twenty-year term pursuant to TRIPS); Agreement on Trade-Related
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Other scholars have likewise noticed the disruption that DMT will
bring to patent law. Mark Lemley has noted that 3D printing and
related technologies make it “entirely plausible to envision a not-toodistant world in which most things that people want can be
downloaded and created on site for very little money — essentially the
cost of raw materials.”261 He explains that in such a world, the need
for intellectual property laws will be dramatically reduced such that
“justified instances of IP will become islands in a sea of cheap goods,
content, and even services delivered to your home in the form of
digital information.”262
But Professor Lemley’s world without scarcity does not yet exist (as
he readily admits).263 Adjusting patent law as a whole based on DMT
does not yet make sense because DMT does not yet account for a
significant amount of manufacturing.264 And even when it does, it
likely will not lower innovation costs equally across all technologies. If
this is so, then lawmakers might decide to avoid weakening all
patents. Instead, they could weaken only patents covering
technologies for which DMT has most dramatically lowered
innovation costs. Technologies most affected by DMT will generally be
those in which designers can create CAD files that will print finished
(or nearly finished) products.265

Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 23, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
(“The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of
twenty years counted from the filing date.”). To attempt to avoid problems with
TRIPS, the PTO could dramatically increase the last of the patent maintenance fees.
Osborn et al., supra note 254, at 55-59.
261 Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity 2 (Stanford Law Sch. of Pub.
Law, Working Paper No. 2413974, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2413974.
262 Id. at 6.
263 Id. at 5.
264 See WOHLERS ASSOCS., WOHLERS REPORT 2013, at 128 (2013) (noting that in 2012
the 3D printing industry’s total revenue was about $3.4 billion and that if it captured
just 1% of the global manufacturing market it would be worth $105 billion). 3D
printing companies use the technology to produce finished parts in about 28% of their
work. Id. at 20.
265 Finished products that can be 3D printed will tend to have reduced
prototyping, development, manufacturing, and distribution costs. Osborn et al., supra
note 254, at 15-35. Even where a manufacturer cannot 3D print a completely finished
product, patent law traditionally protects against the manufacture of non-staple, key
components of the product. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2013). If digital patent
infringement claims do not protect against CAD files that manufacture key
components of products, the incentives to invent those finished products will be
reduced.
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Even before Congress acts, courts could target these DMT-affected
technologies by refusing to recognize a cause of action for digital
patent infringement even though selling and transferring CAD files
harms patentees. This approach has an appeal in that it is inherently
technology-specific: to the extent DMT reduces the need for patents
covering specific technologies, only those patents are affected. On the
other hand, such a decision might best be left to Congress after a
holistic study of the issue.
Needless to say, the effects of DMT on the patent system warrant
careful and thorough study. We cannot here provide an in-depth
analysis, but we hope that future scholarship will explore this
important area.
B. Effects on Laypeople
DMT and digital patent infringement have the unique potential to
bring laypeople into intimate contact with patent law, particularly if
the making, using, and selling of CAD files constitutes direct
infringement. Such persons have little knowledge of patent law.266 Yet
DMT may expose them to potentially massive monetary damages267 for
making, using, selling, and offering to sell CAD files and the
corresponding physical objects.268 Technically, laypeople commit
266 See generally Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual
Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1263-64 (2014) (noting that patent
infringement is determined from an expert, not lay, point of view); Janis & Holbrook,
supra note 98 (discussing various persons who may encounter patent law).
267 Unlike copyright law’s statutory damages, patent law’s monetary remedies are
based on actual harm. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012) (providing for statutory
damages not tied to actual damages), with 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (allowing damages
“adequate to compensate for the infringement” and no provision for statutory
damages). Thus, a patentee would need to prove damages or a reasonable royalty,
which might be difficult, especially where CAD files are distributed without charge.
But even uncompleted offers to sell and free transfers of CAD files can harm the
patentee through lost sales and price erosion. See supra note 125 (discussing price
erosion). A patentee can also obtain an injunction to stop future infringement. See 35
U.S.C. § 283 (2012).
268 Whether or not courts recognize a cause of action for digital infringement,
individuals who print physical objects will be liable as infringers. See, e.g., Doherty,
supra note 18, at 358-60 (describing how 3D printing will expose laypeople to claims
for patent infringement for printing physical objects). But finding these individuals
will be very difficult because they are likely to print the objects in the privacy of their
home. Depoorter, supra note 14, at 1496 (“[S]ince most infringement occurs inside
private homes, there is a greater perception of safety and anonymity with
unauthorized 3D printing than when purchasing illegal goods in markets or online
using a credit card. Like music and movie downloading on peer-to-peer networks,
most infringement will be difficult to detect.”). A cause of action for digital
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patent infringement often even outside of the DMT context. Any time
laypersons use an infringing device — such as a cell phone that might
be covered by thousands of patents — they are infringing any relevant
patents by using the invention.269 Thus far, however, patentees have
generally not sued individual end users, likely because (1) they can
more efficiently sue upstream, centralized, and deep-pocketed
companies, and (2) suing one’s customers is hardly a good business
model for engendering customer goodwill.270
The potential for such widespread liability in the general public is
comparable to laypeople’s exposure to copyright infringement claims
in the Napster and Grokster era, when copyright holders demanded
huge sums of money from teenagers and other individuals.271 Just as
copyright infringement lawsuits against individuals created a
normative backlash against the copyright system and copyright
holders,272 patent infringement lawsuits against unwitting infringers
would likely energize the masses against patent law and patent
holders. Indeed, we have already seen such a backlash against patent
assertion entities, pejoratively referred to as patent trolls, who have
sued small actors like coffee shops.273 The difficulties for patent law
are even greater than they were for copyright because patent law does
not require copying. Moreover, patents are opaque documents,274
directed to technologists and lawyers,275 so even laypersons who may
be aware of the patent would likely have no idea whether they
infringe.276 Most people who copied music knew they were doing
infringement would undoubtedly increase legal exposure of individuals.
269 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (defining unauthorized use of patented invention as act
of direct infringement). The smart phone users would not be infringing if the
manufacturer of the phone had obtained a license, thus exhausting the patent rights as
to the consumer. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 635-38
(2008).
270 See Hughes, supra note 14, at 728-29 (summarizing arguments against suing
customers, but arguing that sometimes it may be a good idea).
271 Amy Harmon, Recording Industry Goes After Students over Music Sharing, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 23, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/23/us/recording-industrygoes-after-students-over-music-sharing.html.
272 Id.
273 See Scott Joslove, Patent Trolls Threaten Small Businesses, THE HILL CONGRESS
BLOG (Dec. 05, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economybudget/192096-patent-trolls-threaten-small-businesses.
274 Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621,
633-41 (2010) (discussing the complex language of patents).
275 Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779,
785-86 (2011) (discussing technical and legal nature of the patent document).
276 Janis & Holbrook, supra note 98, at 88-89 & n.53.
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something the law forbade,277 but individuals are unlikely to have any
idea that CAD files and their physical instantiations infringe a
patent.278 Further, even if someone became concerned about patent
infringement, determining whether the patent was infringed would
likely require an expensive attorney, and even then a large zone of
uncertainty may persist.279
As DMT matures, lawmakers and patent holders should pay careful
attention to societal norms surrounding patent law. If laypeople see
patent laws as unfair or unduly burdensome, they may decide to break
the law or to advocate for change to it.280 As Professor Wu described
in the copyright context, a legal regime is susceptible to technological
avoidance strategies when it lacks normative support.281 Thus, if
societal norms differ extensively from patent law’s regime, a wave of
internet-based patent “piracy” may emerge.282 Minimally, such a
normative shift could threaten the legitimacy of the patent system.283

277 See David McGuire, Report: Kids Pirate Music Freely, WASH. POST (May 18, 2004,
5:39 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37231-2004May18.html
(“More than half of young Americans with Internet access continue to download free
music even though they know that they are breaking the law, according to a poll
released today.”).
278 See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. Many people will be completely
unaware that a patent exists. WEINBERG, IT WILL BE AWESOME, supra note 18, at 5.
279 Patent infringement is notoriously difficult to predict accurately because it
involves so many indeterminate inquiries, such as validity, claim construction, and the
doctrine of equivalents. See supra notes 95–96.
280 See Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 605-07 (discussing change
and avoidance responses to laws).
281 Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 707-08 (2003) (stating that a
regime that relies on gatekeeper enforcement and lacks normative support is
susceptible to technological avoidance strategies).
282 See Depoorter, supra note 14, at 1493 (“Users of 3D printers will likely form
beliefs and attitudes that support liberal uses of 3D printers and will reject legal
reform to the contrary. Users of 3D printers might experience loss aversion when what
they consider to be legitimate is suddenly found to be illegal. In this process, the
perception of having something ‘taken away’ might add to the resistance we can
expect when IP rights will be enforced on products of 3D printing.”); Osborn,
Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 619 (“To the extent [patent law] does not
suffer from a normative weakness, 3D printing will pose less of a piracy threat to the
patent regime than to the copyright and trademark regimes.”).
283 See generally Depoorter, supra note 14, at 1498-99 (“If the public perceives
enforcement to be excessive, this might reinforce or strengthen a belief that the legal
regime is not legitimate or that a legal rule is unjust.”); Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark
D. Janis, Expressive Eligibility, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript
at 13) (on file with authors) (discussing the Supreme Court’s potential concerns in
eligibility doctrine with the legitimacy of the patent system).
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Facing the prospect of massive infringement by the general public,
courts may decide to avoid this problem by not recognizing claims for
digital patent infringement. Another option would be simply to
exempt individuals from patent infringement suits involving digital
patent infringement, similar to proposals made in the patent assertion
entity context.284 Such a step, however, would need to be legislative
because the patent statute does not contain any such carveouts.
Both of these proposed solutions, however, are overbroad: they
would protect not only innocent laypersons but also intentional,
repeat infringers who appropriate a significant share of a patent’s
value. To resolve this problem, one could extend liability only to those
making commercial use of the patented invention.285 In addition, the
law could extend liability only to individual infringers who bear some
culpability, rejecting the current strict liability regime. Culpability
could range from an intent to infringe, knowledge of infringement,
recklessness, negligence, or simply having actual notice of a patent.
The highest standards, intent to infringe and knowledge of
infringement, would make it difficult for patentees to enforce their
patent for the same reasons as in the indirect infringement context.286
Intermediate standards like recklessness and negligence would give
courts flexibility to work toward a fair result, but would come at the
costs of uncertainty and litigation expense. An objective test that asks
whether the accused infringer had actual notice of the patent reduces
uncertainty and expense, but puts a relatively high burden on
laypeople to ascertain the merits of a potential patent dispute.
Alternatively, courts could use remedies to achieve the same
objectives. Courts could decline to use injunctive relief against
innocent infringers. As to damages, courts could use an infringer’s
status as an innocent infringer to reduce the damages considerably,
with a reasonable royalty rate approaching zero. This flexibility is in
sharp contrast to copyright law, which has statutory damages that
limit courts’ discretion.287 Whereas judges have no choice to award
284 E.g., Legislative Solutions for Patent Reform, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/legislative-solutions-patent-reform (last visited Aug. 8,
2014) (“End-user immunity — The law should not allow trolls to prey on end
users.”).
285 For a proposal along these lines, but for the actual printing of the physical
object, see Doherty, supra note 18, at 368-69. Another proposal, also offered in the
context of printing the physical object, suggests limiting infringement suits to those
involving a minimum amount in controversy. See Desai & Magliocca, supra note 39,
at 1717.
286 See supra notes 81–101 and accompanying text.
287 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
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statutory damages if plaintiffs elect that remedy in the copyright
context, judges have greater flexibility in the patent context to address
concerns of digital infringement against innocent infringers from the
general public.
In sum, DMT will expose laypersons to patent infringement liability
on an unprecedented scale. As this potential becomes reality, various
actors in the patent system must be prepared to address the potential
consequences. Our purpose is to highlight some of these issues; it is
far beyond the scope of this Article to be able to address all of them.
We leave those questions to future study.
C. Effects on Intermediaries288
Individuals are not the only group affected by digital patent
infringement. With digital infringement, websites and other
intermediaries that host CAD files may be exposed to additional
liability beyond concerns of indirect infringement.289 With each
assertion of direct infringement, intermediaries would face the same
expense and uncertainty as individuals do. While intermediaries might
have more resources than individuals, they could face a staggering
number of infringement assertions because they host many files.
Rather than face the expense and distraction of defending patent suits,
the intermediaries may simply shut down even if only a small
percentage of their files were infringing. But losing legitimate CAD file
intermediaries would harm DMT’s progress and leave society without
useful tools for sharing legitimate CAD files.
These intermediaries resemble those involved in copyright disputes
(such as YouTube and Napster) in that they host files without direct
knowledge of each specific file on their site.290 Realizing this
similarity, commentators have proposed to protect innocent
intermediaries from indirect infringement claims by enacting a
DMCA-like regime291for the patent context.292 Such a regime would
288 Here, we mean online intermediaries, in contrast to the manufacturing
intermediaries that are needed in traditional manufacturing contexts. See Depoorter,
supra note 14, at 1495 (discussing “intermediaries in manufacturing”).
289 See supra notes 59–70 and accompanying text.
290 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 922-24
(2005).
291 For a description of the DMCA, see Doherty, supra note 18, at 365-66.
292 A well-written student note represents an early example of this proposal. See id.
at 365-68. Other commentators have echoed this call. See, e.g., Desai & Magliocca,
supra note 39, at 1718-19 (arguing for extending the notice-and-takedown rules of the
DMCA to patents and trade dress).
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allow patent holders to send take-down requests for files they believe
infringe, and the intermediary could protect itself from infringement
claims if it took the file down.293 Such a proposal could be extended to
direct digital infringement. Under this regime, intermediaries would
be immune from liability until they have actual notice of a claim for
infringement. We realize that, as in the copyright context,294 a
takedown regime may be abused and lead to non-infringing material
being removed. Further, the cost of evaluating a responding to
takedown notices may result in a de facto extrajudicial regime where
any assertion by a patent holder results in the removal of the file.
Recognizing these flaws, we nonetheless believe that if courts choose
to recognize claims for digital infringement, a DMCA-like process
would be preferable to a regime where intermediaries face liability for
direct digital infringement even without actual notice of a patent.
D. Spillover Effects
Recognizing a cause of action for digital patent infringement would
yield many follow-on effects, some of which we have identified
herein.295 One secondary effect we wish to highlight is our expectation
that patent holders would seek to extend the logic to software patents
by analogy.296 Patent law does not permit claiming software in the
abstract, but courts did allow claims directed to software loaded on
computer-readable medium.297 In the aftermath the Supreme Court’s
293

Doherty, supra note 18, at 365-68.
See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling
Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 666-79 (2006) (describing various
problems with DMCA takedown notices in a data set studied by the authors).
295 See supra note 239.
296 We recognize that software patents are notoriously difficult to define. See Mark
A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WISC. L. REV.
905, 931 n.102 [hereinafter Software Patents] (listing several attempts to define
software patents). Although CAD files fall under a broad definition of software, here
we define software as “the programs that run on a computer and perform certain
functions.” Software, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
software (last visited July 1, 2014). Thus, as we use the terms, patented “software”
relates to application programs that run on a general-purpose computer, whereas
“files” connote collections of data used by software programs. See File,
TECHTERMS.COM, http://www.techterms.com/definition/file (last visited July 2, 2014).
In this usage, software programs include AutoCAD or Microsoft Word, which interact
with files such as CAD files or Word documents, respectively.
297 See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (2001) (discussing the history of software
patents). Computer-readable media include CDs and diskettes. Courts also allowed
294
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decision in Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International, it remains
unclear to what extent, if at all, computer software remains patent
eligible.298
One popular patent claim format for capturing a software-onreadable-medium invention has been the Beauregard claim, based on
the eponymous case that allowed such claims.299 A Beauregard-style
claim would give a patent holder direct control over infringing files,300
but the viability of these claims (and other software patent claims) are
in doubt in light of recent case law.301 Because Beauregard-style claims
are of doubtful validity, patentees might seek to extend digital
infringement logic to non-3D printing patent claims that require
software loaded on a computer.302
Even if courts recognize a cause of action for digital patent
infringement for CAD files, we think reasons exist for not extending
analogous actions to traditional software patent infringement. As an
software to be claimed through method and system claims. Id. at 10-11.
298 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014) (requiring
software to improve functioning of computer to be eligible subject matter and stating
that mere implementation on generic computers is insufficient); Timothy R. Holbrook
& Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An Audience Perspective, 17 VAND. J. OF ENT.
& TECH. L. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 110-15) (on file with authors)
(criticizing the “eligibility as king” dynamic emerging in patent doctrine).
299 In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (vacating the Patent
Office Board of Appeal’s decision because the parties, one of whom was the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, had come to share the view “that computer
programs embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101”).
300 See Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 587 n.206; Dillon, supra
note 18, at 452-55.
301 See, e.g., Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (finding patent claims invalid as too
abstract where the claims were directed to a computer system and method for assisting
with closing financial transactions in a way that avoids settlement risk); Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (rejecting the “useful, concrete, and tangible result”
test used in State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); Planet Bingo LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1009
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (invalidating a computer-aided method and system for managing a
game of bingo); Digitech Image Tech., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (invalidating a process of combining two datasets into a single
data set); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374-75 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (invalidating a Beauregard-style claim); see also David L. Schwartz,
Retroactivity at the Federal Circuit, 89 IND. L.J. 1547, 1562-64 (2014); Ashby Jones,
Courts Nix More Software Patents, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2014, 7:48 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/federal-courts-reject-more-software-patents-aftersupreme-court-ruling-1411343300 (detailing patents invalidated after Alice Corp.).
302 For an example of such a claim, see Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S.
437 (2007). See also supra notes 133–59 and accompanying text.
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initial matter, we observe that in contrast to the many-times intangible
outputs of criticized software patents,303 CAD files produce mechanical
objects that lie at core of traditional patentable subject matter.
Furthermore, whatever criticisms exist against digital patent
infringement for CAD files, even more criticisms exist against software
patents.304 One criticism is that software patent claims have an
uncertain scope and meaning, thus making infringement difficult to
determine.305 With digital patent infringement, however, the patent
claims are directed to traditional apparatus claims, which involve much
less uncertainty. Second, software patents may be less likely to be valid
than other kinds of patents,306 but no evidence suggests that the
mechanical patents that would be involved in digital patent
infringement are of suspect validity. Third, observers assert that
software patents are overbroad, using functional claims to cover more
than what was actually invented.307 These criticisms would generally
not apply to mechanical devices.308 Finally, software patents tend to be
associated with patent thickets, defensive patenting,309 and patent trolls
303 See, e.g., Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software
and Business-Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 833-36 (2003) (criticizing
software and business method patents); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible
Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System
Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 578-79 (1999) (discussing business method
patents, many of which are software patents).
304 See, e.g., Lemley, Software Patents, supra note 296, at 928 (“Software patents are
widely acknowledged as creating a large number of problems for the patent system.”).
But see David Kappos, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Keynote Address at the
Center for American Progress: An Examination of Software Patents (Nov. 20, 2012),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2012/kappos_CAP.jsp (arguing in
favor of software patents).
305 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744-45 (2009).
306 John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 707-09 (2011); Robert Hunt & James Bessen, The Software
Patent Experiment, BUS. REV., July–Sept. 2004, at 22, 24-27, available at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/business-review/2004/
q3/brq304rh.pdf.
307 See Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Functionality Malfunction and the
Problem of Overbroad, Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1399, 1400
(2013) (“Software patents are overbroad. Compared to patents in other fields of
endeavor, they routinely grant inventors rights that extend further beyond the
technology that an inventor has actually invented and disclosed.”); Lemley, Software
Patents, supra note 296, at 907-08.
308 Lemley, Software Patents, supra note 296, at 908-09 (“This is a problem
primarily in software.”).
309 Defensive patenting refers to “the strategy of obtaining patent protection without
necessarily intending to assert or enforce those negative rights associated with a patent.”

2015]

Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing

1381

(non-practicing entities).310 Although patents directed to mechanical
devices are not immune from contributing to these phenomena, no
data suggest that they do so disproportionately. Cumulatively, these
arguments against software patents suggest courts should hesitate
before extending additional patent protection for software.
Moreover, courts need not extend digital patent infringement to
traditional software patents because they enjoy additional protection
via copyright.311 Copyright protection is important to software
developers precisely because it allows them a measure of control over
the unauthorized distribution of software code uncombined with
hardware.312 The drawback of copyright is that it protects against only
near-verbatim copying of the software,313 while patents protect
software functionality more broadly.314 Nevertheless, the ability to
stop the pirates who copy software verbatim is a valuable tool for
software developers.315
Admittedly, CAD files may be eligible for copyright protection,316
but such protection will likely be more limited than even that for
computer programs. CAD files fit within copyright law’s definition of a
computer program,317 but are unlikely to contain creativity in the
same way as program software. Unlike program software, which
developers structure in part based on creative expression, the text or
code of CAD files is unlikely to be structured creatively.318 For this
Dan Pierron, Defensive Patenting, WIDERMAN MALEK (May 23, 2013, 8:57 AM),
http://www.legalteamusa.net/tacticalip/2013/05/23/defensive-patenting. Companies obtain
these defensive patents as a determent against others suing them. Id.
310 See Lemley, Software Patents, supra note 296, at 928-29, 932-34.
311 Computer programs enjoy dual protection under both copyright and patent
law: the creative, as opposed to utilitarian, aspects of computer software are protected
as literary works under copyright law. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (3d Cir. 1983); see also 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2012).
312 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39
STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1369 (1987) (noting that copyright “inhibit[s] competing firms
from reproducing [software] on a mass scale”).
313 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited,
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV., 1746, 1770 (2011) (noting that copyright law as applied to
software “generally results in programs having thin copyright protection”); see also
Osborn, Art and 3D Printing, supra note 39, at 825.
314 Many say too broadly. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 296, at 5.
315 Menell, supra note 312, at 1369.
316 Osborn, Art and 3D Printing, supra note 39, at 825-34 (analyzing the possibility
of protecting CAD files through copyright).
317 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining a computer program as “a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result”).
318 Osborn, Art and 3D Printing, supra note 39, at 825-26. Although the object

1382

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 48:1319

reason, CAD files are protectable under copyright, if at all, as pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural (“PGS”) works.319 Although the categorization
of CAD files under copyright law may be tedious, it is not
inconsequential. As PGS works, CAD files must contain originality
and are only protectable to the extent that they are not useful
articles.320 These requirements limit protections for files created by
scanning and perhaps files drawn manually if they lack originality.321
It is possible that courts might construe all CAD files for utilitarian
objects as useful articles because their primary purpose is utilitarian —
to instruct a printer how to make a useful object.322 While a detailed
copyright analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, at least some
CAD files will not be protectable by copyright and uncertainty exists
as to many others.323
Finally, even if a particular CAD file had copyright protection, that
would not prevent another person from independently creating his
own CAD file. Where copyright law does not protect the underlying
physical object (for example, because it is a useful article), anyone is
free to make her own CAD file of it; they simply cannot copy the
copyrighted CAD file.324 Because 3D scanners and related technology
may allow for virtually costless independent creation of CAD files
embodied in the CAD file may be creative, the actual “code” used to describe it will
simply be the exact, uncreative instructions needed to depict the object. Program
software, in contrast, can contain creative organization. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-12 (2d Cir. 1992).
319 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining PGS works in part as “two-dimensional and threedimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art
reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings,
including architectural plans”).
320 Osborn, Art and 3D Printing, supra note 39, at 826-33.
321 MICHAEL WEINBERG, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, WHAT’S THE DEAL WITH COPYRIGHT AND 3D
PRINTING? 15-20 (Jan. 29, 2013) [hereinafter WHAT’S THE DEAL], available at
https://www.publicknowledge.org/files/What’s%20the%20Deal%20with%20Copyright
_%20Final%20version2.pdf; Desai & Magliocca, supra note 39, at 1706-08; Osborn,
Art and 3D Printing, supra note 39, at 828-31.
322 Osborn, Art and 3D Printing, supra note 39, at 832-33.
323 For a fuller exposition of these points, see id. at 824-835. See also WEINBERG,
WHAT’S THE DEAL, supra note 321, at 5-22.
324 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1903). This is
why more than one artist can paint a picture of Mount Everest: Mount Everest is not
copyrightable. But one cannot copy another’s painting of Mount Everest, because the
painting is protected by copyright. Id. at 249 (“Others are free to copy the original.
They are not free to copy the copy.”). To put this in the DMT context, copyright law
will not stop someone from independently creating a CAD file of a fuel injector
(which is not copyrightable because it is a useful article), either from scratch or by 3D
scanning it.
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from physical objects, any copyright protection of CAD files for
utilitarian objects may be valueless.325
In sum, commentators heavily criticize software patents, and
copyright law can protect software. Hence, even if courts recognize
claims for digital patent infringement for CAD files, we do not think
an analogous extension should be made for software-combined-withhardware patents.
E. Impact on Follow-On Innovation
The patent system is not concerned with creating incentives for
merely the first invention.326 Patents disclose the invention,327
encouraging other innovators to draw on the teachings of the patent
and to improve upon it or design around it.328 If a follow-on innovator
makes the invention, then technically they are infringing, as there are
only extremely limited safe harbors for experimenting with patented
inventions.329 One way to avoid this problem is for a follow-on
innovator to create computer models or designs of the patented
invention, and then to alter them virtually to explore ways to improve
or design around the patent.330
A robust regime of digital patent infringement could undermine the
ability of others to design around the patented invention.331 If we view
creation of the CAD file as a form of “making” the claimed invention,
then even these digital efforts to design around would technically be a

325 Although software may also be reverse engineered, the underlying object (the
software code) is protected by copyright. Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992) (“It is now well settled that the literal elements of
computer programs, i.e., their source and object codes, are the subject of copyright
protection.”).
326 See State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(“One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called ‘negative incentive’ to ‘design
around’ a competitor’s products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady
flow of innovations to the marketplace.”).
327 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
328 Holbrook, Possession, supra note 259, at 131-32; Osborn, Ripple Effects, supra
note 221, at 583-84.
329 See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 81, 83.
330 See B. Thomas Watson, Carbons into Bytes: Patented Chemical Compound
Protection in the Virtual World, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 25, 28-29 (2014) (describing
the use of molecular modeling to avoid infringing a patent to a chemical).
331 Cf. Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 779 (“An overly broad definition
of offer to sell infringement could have a chilling effect on competitors, particularly
attempts to design around the patent.”).
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form of infringement. These concerns about downstream users
counsel against extending the definition of “making” to these
activities. In contrast, allowing “sales” of, and “offers to sell,” CAD
files to constitute infringement may not encounter the same concerns,
or at least not to the same degree. Sales activity necessarily means that
a party is attempting to commercialize the invention, appropriating its
economic value.332 There is less concern that the infringer is seeking to
improve upon the invention in this context. Consideration of these
downstream impacts supports a bifurcated approach: maintain a
tangibility requirement for “making” the patented invention, but
permit intangible infringement by “selling” or “offering to sell” the
claimed innovation.
Whether to extend patent law in the ways we have explored is
clearly a complex question. Even though digital infringement,
particularly direct infringement, is justifiable on technical terms, such
an expansion may work considerable costs on other parties.
CONCLUSION
The interaction of the patent system and DMT is a difficult one. The
extent to which the patent system should respond to the unique issues
that DMT present is a vexing question that could have significant
impacts on the incentives that patents are intended to provide. On one
hand, the proliferation of such technologies likely will negatively
impact patent owners, making it more difficult for inventors to protect
their innovations from unauthorized appropriation. This concern
suggests that the patent system should accommodate greater patent
protection, be it through indirect infringement or, as we posit in this
Article, expanded views of direct infringement. On the other hand, an
overly broad expansion of patent protection could work considerable
costs and negative collateral impacts on third parties and other
incentives, such as the incentive to design around patented
technologies. Given the potency of patents’ exclusive rights, courts or
Congress must carefully consider the benefits and disadvantages of
expansively applying patent infringement doctrine to emerging DMT.
Nevertheless, we believe that affording protection to patent holders
against sales or offers to sell the CAD files strikes the appropriate
balance. In this context, the accused infringer is seeking to extract the
commercial value of the invention, undermining the value of the patent
to the patentee. Liability here is less likely to trigger the collateral
consequences that we have addressed because the infringer is directly
332

Id. at 805.
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competing with the patent holder in some way, as opposed to merely
using CAD files to design around the patent. The economic value of the
patented invention is what will drive the commercial demand for the
CAD file. As such, we believe that an extension of Transocean is an
appropriate way to protect patent holders’ economic interests.
Whether a CAD file should constitute an infringing “making” of the
claimed invention presents far more complex issues. As a technological
matter, we believe that the divide between the tangible and intangible
has been almost entirely bridged by DMT. Because the physical
instantiation of the patented article is a mere touch of the button away,
treating the CAD file differently than the product produced by the 3D
printer seems arbitrary. From this technological perspective, then, the
courts could reasonably conclude that a CAD file alone constitutes an
infringing “making” of the claimed invention, even if the invention is
never printed. To reject this approach risks creating significant gaps in
the protection that a patent affords to its owner.
Yet, this extension gives us pause because of the potential collateral
consequences that would arise. Because patent infringement is a strict
liability tort, permitting CAD files alone to be infringing, even in the
absence of commercial activity, would open up a wide swath of
potential liability. Someone who is simply are scanning a patented
item into a CAD file could now be viewed as infringing, having
reconstructed the device via the CAD file. Persons creating CAD files,
either by designing them or by scanning an item, differ significantly
from persons seeking to commercialize CAD files through sales or
offers to sell. Thus, we are not so sanguine that liability for making a
patented invention should extend to CAD files alone. Any such
expansion — be it by the courts or Congress — should only take place
after a careful consideration of the externalities such liability could
generate.

